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ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Recently, a rising interest in political and economic integration/disintegration 
issues has been developed in the political economy field. This growing strand of 
literature partly draws on traditional issues of fiscal federalism and optimum 
public good provision and focuses on a trade-off between the benefits of 
centralization, arising from economies of scale or externalities, and the costs of 
harmonizing policies as a consequence of the increased heterogeneity of 
individual preferences in an international union or in a country composed of at 
least two regions.  
This thesis stems from this strand of literature and aims to shed some light 
on two highly relevant aspects of the political economy of European integration. 
The first concerns the role of public opinion in the integration process; more 
precisely, how economic benefits and costs of integration shape citizens' 
support for European Union (EU) membership. The second is the allocation of 
policy competences among different levels of government: European, national 
and regional. 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the topics developed in this thesis by reviewing the 
main recent theoretical developments in the political economy analysis of 
integration processes. It is structured as follows. First, it briefly surveys a few 
relevant articles on economic theories of integration and disintegration 
processes (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina et al. 
2000, Casella and Feinstein 2002) and discusses their relevance for the study 
of the impact of economic benefits and costs on public opinion attitude towards 
the EU. Subsequently, it explores the links existing between such political 
economy literature and theories of fiscal federalism, especially with regard to 
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normative considerations concerning the optimal allocation of competences in a 
union.  
 
Chapter 2 firstly proposes a model of citizens’ support for membership of 
international unions, with explicit reference to the EU; subsequently it tests the 
model on a panel of EU countries. 
What are the factors that influence public opinion support for the European 
Union (EU)? In international relations theory, the idea that citizens' support for 
the EU depends on material benefits deriving from integration, i.e. whether 
European integration makes individuals economically better off (utilitarian 
support), has been common since the 1970s, but has never been the subject of 
a formal treatment (Hix 2005). A small number of studies in the 1990s have 
investigated econometrically the link between national economic performance 
and mass support for European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; 
Anderson and Kalthenthaler 1996), but only making informal assumptions. The 
main aim of Chapter 2 is thus to propose and test our model with a view to 
providing a more complete and theoretically grounded picture of public support 
for the EU. 
Following theories of utilitarian support, we assume that citizens are in 
favour of membership if they receive economic benefits from it. To develop this 
idea, we propose a simple political economic model drawing on the recent 
economic literature on integration and disintegration processes. The basic 
element is the existence of a trade-off between the benefits of centralisation and 
the costs of harmonising policies in presence of heterogeneous preferences 
among countries. The approach we follow is that of the recent literature on the 
political economy of international unions and the unification or break-up of 
nations (Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina and Wacziarg 1999, Alesina et al. 
2001, 2005a, to mention only the relevant). The general perspective is that 
unification provides returns to scale in the provision of public goods, but 
reduces each member state’s ability to determine its most favoured bundle of 
public goods.  
In the simple model presented in Chapter 2, support for membership of the 
union is increasing in the union’s average income and in the loss of efficiency 
stemming from being outside the union, and decreasing in a country’s average 
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income, while increasing heterogeneity of preferences among countries points 
to a reduced scope of the union. 
Afterwards we empirically test the model with data on the EU; more 
precisely, we perform an econometric analysis employing a panel of member 
countries over time. The second part of Chapter 2 thus tries to answer the 
following question: does public opinion support for the EU really depend on 
economic factors? The findings are broadly consistent with our theoretical 
expectations: the conditions of the national economy, differences in income 
among member states and heterogeneity of preferences shape citizens’ attitude 
towards their country’s membership of the EU.  
Consequently, this analysis offers some interesting policy implications for 
the present debate about ratification of the European Constitution and, more 
generally, about how the EU could act in order to gain more support from the 
European public. Citizens in many member states are called to express their 
opinion in national referenda, which may well end up in rejection of the 
Constitution, as recently happened in France and the Netherlands, triggering a 
European-wide political crisis. These events show that nowadays understanding 
public attitude towards the EU is not only of academic interest, but has a strong 
relevance for policy-making too.  
 
 
Chapter 3 empirically investigates the link between European integration 
and regional autonomy in Italy. Over the last few decades, the double tendency 
towards supranationalism and regional autonomy, which has characterised 
some European States, has taken a very interesting form in this country, 
because Italy, besides being one of the founding members of the EU, also 
implemented a process of decentralisation during the 1970s, further 
strengthened by a constitutional reform in 2001. 
Moreover, the issue of the allocation of competences among the EU, the 
Member States and the regions is now especially topical. The process leading 
to the drafting of European Constitution (even if then it has not come into force) 
has attracted much attention from a constitutional political economy perspective 
both on a normative and positive point of view (Breuss and Eller 2004, Mueller 
2005). The Italian parliament has recently passed a new thorough constitutional 
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reform, still to be approved by citizens in a referendum, which includes, among 
other things, the so called “devolution”, i.e. granting the regions exclusive 
competence in public health care, education and local police.   
Following and extending the methodology proposed in a recent influential 
article by Alesina et al. (2005b), which only concentrated on the EU activity 
(treaties, legislation, and European Court of Justice’s rulings), we develop a set 
of quantitative indicators measuring the intensity of the legislative activity of the 
Italian State, the EU and the Italian regions from 1973 to 2005 in a large 
number of policy categories. By doing so, we seek to answer the following 
broad questions. Are European and regional legislations substitutes for state 
laws? To what extent are the competences attributed by the European treaties 
or the Italian Constitution actually exerted in the various policy areas? Is their 
exertion consistent with the normative recommendations from the economic 
literature about their optimum allocation among different levels of government? 
The main results show that, first, there seems to be a certain substitutability 
between EU and national legislations (even if not a very strong one), but not 
between regional and national ones. Second, the EU concentrates its legislative 
activity mainly in international trade and agriculture, whilst social policy is where 
the regions and the State (which is also the main actor in foreign policy) are 
more active. Third, at least two levels of government (in some cases all of them) 
are significantly involved in the legislative activity in many sectors, even where 
the rationale for that is, at best, very questionable, indicating that they actually 
share a larger number of policy tasks than that suggested by the economic 
theory. 
It appears therefore that an excessive number of competences are actually 
shared among different levels of government. From an economic perspective, it 
may well be recommended that some competences be shared, but only when 
the balance between scale or spillover effects and heterogeneity of preferences 
suggests so. When, on the contrary, too many levels of government are 
involved in a certain policy area, the distinction between their different 
responsibilities easily becomes unnecessarily blurred. This may not only leads 
to a slower and inefficient policy-making process, but also risks to make it too 
complicate to understand for citizens, who, on the contrary, should be able to 
know who is really responsible for a certain policy when they vote in national, 
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local or European elections or in referenda on national or European 
constitutional issues. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Recently, a rising interest in political and economic integration/disintegration 
issues has been developed in the political economy field. This growing strand of 
literature partly draws on traditional issues of fiscal federalism and optimum 
public good provision and focuses on a trade-off between the benefits of 
centralization, arising from economies of scale or externalities, and the costs of 
harmonizing policies as a consequence of the increased heterogeneity of 
individual preferences in an international union or in a country composed of at 
least two regions.  
The two pathbreaking articles in this field were Alesina and Spolaore (1997) 
on the size of countries and Bolton and Roland (1997) on secessionist 
tendencies inside countries. Afterwards, the analysis has been extended to 
include issues such as the size and the functioning of international unions 
(Alesina et al. 2005a). 
All these papers are of theoretical nature, but pay a special attention to the 
experience of European integration. This study stems from this strand of 
literature and aims to shed some light on two apparently unrelated aspects of 
the political economy of European integration which, instead, at a closer 
inspection present significant links. The first concerns the role of public opinion 
in the integration process; more precisely, how economic benefits and costs of 
integration shape citizens' support for European Union (EU) membership. The 
second is the allocation of policy competences among different levels of 
government: European, national and regional. 
What are the politico-economic links between these two subjects? The role 
of public opinion in the process of European economic and political integration 
has so far been neglected by economists, whereas international relations 
scholars have been paying it increasing attention in the last fifteen years, 
because the implementation of international bargains struck by governments 
often requires domestic support, as the use of referendum in some member 
states clearly demonstrates. In 2005, France and the Netherlands rejected the 
European Constitution by referendum, opening a serious political crisis in the 
EU and probably causing the death of the Constitution itself. It seems therefore 
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correct to argue that ‘European mass publics have the ability and the 
willingness to constrain and possibly forestall further progress toward a unified 
Europe’ (Anderson 1998, p.570). Our model (as we will discuss in more detail 
below) will assume and will find empirical evidence that mass support for the 
EU depends on economic factors, but that, to evaluate the impact of EU activity 
on their well-being, citizens of a certain country are not interested in the 
economic performance of the EU as a whole, but in that of their national 
economy. Despite the integrated nature of the European market and of some 
EU policy programs, therefore, the performance of the market is still measured 
at the national level.  
The increasing complexity of the allocation of policy tasks between the EU 
and the Member States, associated with a low level of public knowledge about 
EU competences (as frequently testified by the European Commission's 
Eurobarometer surveys), makes the EU an easy scapegoat for unpopular 
national policies or for national governments' failures. For instance, claiming at 
the same time that Member States have exclusive competence over 
employment policies and that Europe has an employment strategy for 
‘reforming labour markets’ and ‘achieving full employment’, as official EU 
documents do, may clearly lead to voters’ dissatisfaction with the European 
Union (Sapir 2006).  
As Moravcsik (2005) observed, the ‘no’ votes in the French and Dutch 
referendums were above all a reaction of those fearful of unemployment, labour 
market reform, globalization, privatization and the consolidation of the welfare 
state: ‘This type of disaffection is the primary political problem for European 
governments today, since it is directed both against poor economic 
performance and against reform measures designed to improve it’ (p.3). 
Surmounting this difficult political problem requires clear and strong political 
leadership by national governments. Therefore, placing responsibility where 
power lies seems to be crucial for the well functioning of the EU system.  
The issue to be investigated is thus the following: "who actually does what"?. 
To do so, it would be not enough to focus only on the relations between the EU 
and the Member States.  One more level of government has to be considered: 
the regional one. As suggested by Alesina et al. (2003), 'Separatism within 
nations and delegation of policies to supranational entities could well be [...] 
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complementary parts of the same process' (p.26). Indeed, in the early 1990s, 
some observers prefigured the creation of a "Europe of the Regions " (e.g. 
Drèze 1993), where economic integration could be accompanied by political 
disintegration. Such an extreme scenario have proved unrealistic and no cases 
of secession have taken place in Western Europe, but the recent European 
history has actually experienced, on the one hand, a transfer of powers to a 
supranational entity like the EU and, on the other hand, a move towards more 
regional autonomy by some large Member States (Italy, the UK, Spain and, to a 
lesser extent, France). The last part of the study will therefore tackle this issue, 
by specifically analysing the case of Italy from a constitutional political economy 
perspective. 
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CHAPTER 1: POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORIES OF 
INTEGRATION: A SURVEY 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Recently, a rising interest in political and economic integration/disintegration 
issues has been developed in the political economy field. This growing strand of 
literature partly draws on traditional issues of fiscal federalism and optimum 
public good provision and focuses on a trade-off between the benefits of 
centralization, arising from economies of scale or externalities, and the costs of 
harmonizing policies as a consequence of the increased heterogeneity of 
individual preferences in an international union or in a country composed of at 
least two regions.  
This thesis stems from this strand of literature and aims to shed some light 
on two apparently unrelated aspects of the political economy of European 
integration which, instead, at a closer inspection present significant links. The 
first concerns the role of public opinion in the integration process; more 
precisely, how economic benefits and costs of integration shape citizens' 
support for European Union (EU) membership. The second is the allocation of 
policy competences among different levels of government: European, national 
and regional. 
What are the politico-economic links between these two subjects? The role 
of public opinion in the process of European economic and political integration 
has so far been neglected by economists, whereas international relations 
scholars have been paying it increasing attention in the last fifteen years, 
because the implementation of international bargains struck by governments 
often requires domestic support, as the use of referendum in some member 
states clearly demonstrates. In 2005, France and the Netherlands rejected the 
European Constitution by referendum, opening a serious political crisis in the 
EU and probably causing the death of the Constitution itself. It seems therefore 
correct to argue that ‘European mass publics have the ability and the 
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willingness to constrain and possibly forestall further progress toward a unified 
Europe’ (Anderson 1998, p.570). The model presented in Chapter 2 will assume 
and will find empirical evidence that mass support for the EU depends on 
economic factors, but that, to evaluate the impact of EU activity on their well-
being, citizens of a certain country are not interested in the economic 
performance of the EU as a whole, but in that of their national economy. 
Despite the integrated nature of the European market and of some EU policy 
programs, therefore, the performance of the market is still measured at the 
national level.  
The increasing complexity of the allocation of policy tasks between the EU 
and the Member States, associated with a low level of public knowledge about 
EU competences (as frequently testified by the European Commission's 
Eurobarometer surveys), makes the EU an easy scapegoat for unpopular 
national policies or for national governments' failures. For instance, claiming at 
the same time that Member States have exclusive competence over 
employment policies and that Europe has an employment strategy for 
‘reforming labour markets’ and ‘achieving full employment’, as official EU 
documents do, may clearly lead to voters’ dissatisfaction with the European 
Union (Sapir 2006).  
As Moravcsik (2005) observed, the ‘no’ votes in the French and Dutch 
referendums were above all a reaction of those fearful of unemployment, labour 
market reform, globalisation, privatisation and the consolidation of the welfare 
state: ‘This type of disaffection is the primary political problem for European 
governments today, since it is directed both against poor economic 
performance and against reform measures designed to improve it’ (p.3). 
Surmounting this difficult political problem requires clear and strong political 
leadership by national governments. Therefore, placing responsibility where 
power lies seems to be crucial for the well functioning of the EU system.  
The issue to be investigated is thus the following: "who actually does what"? 
To do so, it would be not enough to focus only on the relations between the EU 
and the Member States.  One more level of government has to be considered: 
the regional one. Indeed, in the early 1990s, some observers prefigured the 
creation of a "Europe of the Regions " (Drèze 1993), where economic 
integration could be accompanied by political disintegration. Such an extreme 
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scenario have proved unrealistic and no cases of secession have taken place in 
Western Europe, but the recent European history has actually experienced, on 
the one hand, a transfer of powers to a supranational entity like the EU and, on 
the other hand, a move towards more regional autonomy by some large 
Member States (Italy, the UK, Spain and, to a lesser extent, France). Chapter 3 
will therefore tackle this issue, by specifically analysing the case of Italy from a 
constitutional political economy perspective. 
This chapter introduces the topics developed in this thesis by reviewing the 
main recent theoretical developments in the political economy analysis of 
integration processes. It is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys a few 
relevant articles on economic theories of integration and disintegration 
processes and discusses their relevance for the study of the impact of 
economic benefits and costs on public opinion attitude towards the EU. Section 
3 explores the links existing between such political economy literature and 
theories of fiscal federalism, especially with regard to normative considerations 
concerning the optimal allocation of competences in a union. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
 
2. Political economy of integration and disintegration 
 
As in the theory of the size distribution of firms, the fundamental question 
this literature must confront is (to paraphrase Ronald Coase): why are there 
nations? Why is the whole world not integrated in a single nation, which 
optimally decentralizes decisions to smaller jurisdictions? Indeed, in principle, 
any decentralization that is achieved with multiple nations could be replicated 
within a federal state by implementing the desired degree of subsidiarity. 
The basic answer to this question is based on the observation that the costs 
and benefits of political integration are not equally distributed among all 
members. When two nations integrate in a single political union not all members 
of both nations benefit from this change; there are winners and losers. Thus, 
when decisions on sovereignty are taken through majority voting it is possible 
that a majority against integration emerges, even if it is efficient to integrate. 
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This parallel between the theory of integration of firms and the theory of 
political and economic integration of nations is useful. There are, however, 
some fundamental differences between the two problems. A merger is a 
contract between two sets of owners which is enforced by courts, while a 
merger of two nations is a treaty which can only be self-enforcing. Another 
difference concerns the decision making process. A merger goes through when 
a majority of voting shares in both firms is in favour of the merger proposal. In 
practice, this means that a handful concentrated owners carries the proposal. 
Thus, a merger between two firms can often be described as a negotiated 
contract between two owners. In contrast, large numbers are involved in 
deciding unification. If the democratic process is followed, the decision is 
adopted when a majority of voters is in favour of unification in both nations. In 
other words, the median voters in each nation determine the outcome. This is a 
fundamental point upon which we will build a link between public opinion and 
the political economy of integration. 
What are the costs and benefits of unification? The general perspective in 
the literature is that unification provides returns to scale in the provision of 
public goods, but reduces each member state’s ability to determine its most 
favoured bundle of public goods. The papers differ in the modelling of public-
goods provision, preferences over public and private goods, and in the 
allocation of public-goods consumption across the population. It must be 
recalled that the issue of country  formation is of course much more complicated 
and that it has several other relevant dimensions, like differences in language, 
culture, and so on that are not addressed in this framework, which concentrates 
on the economic determinants of integration or disintegration.  
Alesina and Spolaore (1997) consider a location model à la Hotelling, but 
they concern themselves with a different set of issues. They ask how the type of 
political institution existing in different countries affects the incentives of nations 
to integrate, and they compare the equilibrium size distribution of nations with 
the socially-optimal distribution. The basic model they consider has the 
following features: 
1) A nation is represented by an interval on a line segment, and a public good is 
chosen in each nation;  
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2) The capital of each nation is located at the midpoint of the interval and all 
public goods are provided in the capital. The further away from the capital 
individuals are located, the less they like the public good;  
3) Political integration provides economic benefits; the size of these benefits is 
greater the higher the impediments to international trade, or the smaller the 
degree of economic integration. The cost of political integration is mainly borne 
by voters at the margins, who are located further away from the public goods. 
Alesina and Spolaore (1997) show that when public good provision and 
political integration are determined through majority voting, then, in equilibrium, 
there tend to be too many small nations. Voters who are located at the borders 
have an incentive to form separate nations to get public goods closer to their 
preferences, and the democratic process does not internalize the negative 
externalities of separation imposed on other voters. In contrast, when political 
institutions are not democratic and when governments are run by self-interested 
individuals whose objective is to maximize net tax revenues, more political 
integration takes place.  
Thus, an important conclusion of their study is that too many nations may 
emerge as democracy spreads. How do economic development and integration 
affect the equilibrium size distribution of nations? An increase in economic 
integration across countries reduces the need for political integration to achieve 
a given level of economic development. However, it also exacerbates the 
problem of political disintegration, so much so that the net effect on welfare of 
an exogenous increase in economic integration may be negative. Thus, even 
though the optimal number of nations increases with economic integration, the 
extent of equilibrium political disintegration may be so large that it obliterates 
the economic gains that may be obtained from greater economic integration. 
Bolton and Roland (1997) concentrate on the role of government to 
redistribute income across agents. While sharing the perspective that political 
integration provides economic benefits, they highlight political conflicts 
originating from differences in income and wealth instead of differences in 
geographical location. 
The emphasis is on the role of regional differences in income distribution in 
shaping regional incentives to secede. To see the main idea, consider a nation  
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with two regions, one (region A) where income is equally distributed and the 
other (region B) where the income distribution is unequal. Both regions may 
have a majority in favour of breaking up the nation when the economic cost of 
separation is not too large. The reason is that under unification the median voter 
in neither region sees her most preferred redistribution policy implemented, 
since it is the median voter in the union (who is generally different) who imposes 
her most preferred policy. Thus, the median voter in region A may prefer lower 
redistribution and the median voter in region B more redistribution of income 
than in the union.  
By splitting up, each median voter can impose a policy that is closer to her 
most preferred policy. Thus, the benefit of separation is to produce government 
policies that are "closer to the people" (that is to say, closer to the wishes of the 
median voters in each region). The main difference with the location approach 
is that differences in median voter preferences are directly tied to an observable 
economic variable, the regional income distribution. 
The main results of the article are that:  
1) Fiscal accommodation in the union reduces the likelihood of secession, but 
by no means prevents the break-up of a nation under all circumstances. In 
addition, fiscal accommodation may be in the direction of higher taxes (when 
the more inegalitarian region is most likely to secede) or lower taxes (when the 
more egalitarian region is most likely to secede); 
2) A federal constitution is an adequate response to secession threats when 
fiscal competition between autonomous regions is likely to be small. Full 
independence may however be preferred to federalism, even if the overall 
economic efficiency loss is greater, when the constraints imposed on the 
median voters by fiscal competition under a federal state are large. 
3) Greater labour mobility is a cementing force of the union, while greater 
capital mobility is not. When all factors are perfectly mobile, separation is self-
defeating.  
Another set of issues addressed by this strand of literature is related to the 
link between economic integration (i.e. the development of free trade) and 
political integration (separation), that is, the formation of larger (smaller) political 
jurisdictions providing some sort of public goods. The basic question these 
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models address is the following: how does globalization of markets affect the 
incentives of countries to integrate or separate? 
The main result in Alesina et al. (2000) is that in a world of trade restrictions 
(at the limit, in a world of autarkic countries), large nations enjoy economic 
benefits, because political boundaries determine the size of the market. The 
presence of increasing returns in the size of the economy, for example, would 
lead to unambiguous economic benefits from political integration. However, 
under free trade and global markets, the incentive to join large jurisdictions 
disappears, while the cost in terms of heterogeneity of national preferences 
remains. In this case, not only will countries not integrate, but small cultural, 
linguistic and ethnic groups within countries can choose to form smaller and 
more homogeneous political jurisdictions. In other words, international 
economic integration could lead to political disintegration, because it reduces 
the cost of political separation. 
Casella and Feinstein (2002) also deal with the interaction of trade and 
political integration. They study a model where the link between economic and 
political integration comes from the fact that the public good provision directly 
affects returns from trade. Trade takes place in the market, where a market is a 
group of agents that exchange private endowments, while the public good is 
provided by the jurisdiction (a club of individuals that decide together, share and 
finance a common public good). In their analysis, economic integration, by 
raising the gains from trade, induces political integration, at least initially. The 
reason is that, at low levels of economic integration, the marginal benefit of 
provision of common public goods outweighs the political cost of forming a 
union. However, at higher levels of economic integration, the benefit may well 
be smaller than the cost of political integration, leading to separatism. 
Casella and Feinstein (2002) and Alesina et al. (2000) capture two different 
aspects of the effects of economic developments on countries’ incentive to 
integrate (separate). In the framework of Casella and Feinstein (2002), when 
the market becomes large, individuals may well realize that their preferences 
about policy and institutions are more similar to those of other trading partners 
outside national borders. Therefore, economic integration is accompanied by 
fragmentation in multiple jurisdictions, but also by an incentive to form new 
jurisdictions that will reshape national borders. This result is driven by the 
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complementarity of market integration and political integration. Instead, in 
Alesina et al. (2000), economic and political integration are substitutes. This is 
why in their model, integration of markets leads only to political disintegration.  
Which links can be established between this literature and the role of public 
opinion in European integration? As anticipated above, a crucial role in these 
theoretical models is played by the median voter, who ultimately decides over 
the integration or disintegration of unions. Therefore the subject of the analysis 
becomes the opinion of the majority of citizens, as shaped by a comparison of 
economic benefits and costs stemming from different institutional solutions.  
The process of creation and development of the EU was traditionally viewed 
as an elite-driven process by the two leading theories of European integration, 
neofunctionalism (Haas 1958, 1964; Lindberg 1963) and intergovernmentalism 
(Hoffmann 1966), the former emphasising the role of supranational institutions, 
the latter that of national governments. Public opinion was not considered as a 
relevant actor and was assumed to show a passive attitude towards the 
integration process, sometimes referred to as “permissive consensus” (Lindberg 
and Scheingold 1970). This concept indicated that citizens in member states 
were either not interested in European affairs or generally supported actions to 
promote integration, but attributed them low political salience.  
The role of public opinion in the process of European integration has been 
paid increasing attention by international relations scholars in the last fifteen 
years (to mention only a few studies, Reif and Inglehart 1991; Franklin et al. 
1994; Anderson 1998; Gabel 1998a; Gilland 2002), starting from the 
observation that attempts to achieve international cooperation often involve the 
domestic ratification of international bargains. Indeed, we have witnessed an 
increasing use of the referendum in some member countries as an instrument 
for ratification of new treaties negotiated by national governments: Single 
European Act (1986), Maastricht Treaty (1992), Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and 
Nice Treaty (2001)1, as documented in Table 1. The outcome has generally 
been positive, but in two cases a treaty was firstly rejected (the Maastricht 
Treaty in Denmark and the Nice Treaty in Ireland), then approved in a second 
referendum after some more concessions or clarifications. Referenda have also 
                                                 
1 The years in parentheses refer to the signature of the treaties. 
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been held in Denmark and Sweden on a specific European issue, namely the 
adoption of the euro; in both cases, the majority of citizens voted against it.  
The two most recent enlargement rounds have been accompanied by 
referenda in all accession countries (except for Cyprus); in 1994, the Norwegian 
citizens decided that their country would not become a member of the EU after 
their government had signed the accession treaty (Table 2). 
Moreover, in 2005 some countries held referenda on the recently agreed 
“Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe” (the so-called “European 
Constitution”). Spain and Luxembourg approved it, but France and the 
Netherlands rejected it, opening a serious political crisis in the EU and probably 
causing the death of the Treaty itself (Table 1). The relevance of the role played 
by public opinion in the current phase of European integration stimulates the 
analysis of the determinants of citizens’ support for the EU. A well-established 
concept in international relations theory is that of ‘utilitarian support’ (Easton 
1965, 1975): an individual supports a certain political system if she believes that 
it promotes her own economic (or political) interests. Applying this concept to an 
international union like the EU, one can argue that people are in favour of 
European integration if it has been making them better off.  
While the importance of economic conditions as a basis for citizens’ 
evaluation of national political institutions is well-documented in the political 
business cycle literature (Alesina et al. 1997), only a small number of studies in 
the 1990s have investigated the link between national economic performance 
and mass support for European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; 
Anderson and Kalthenthaler 1996). These articles draw upon theories of 
economic voting (Lewis-Beck 1988; Norpoth et al. 1991), but only make 
informal assumptions and are mainly empirical2. To the best of our knowledge, 
this topic has never been the subject of a formal treatment. Indeed, usual formal 
models of political business cycle at the national level are not well suited for the 
EU level, because there is no EU-wide political cycle between two subsequent 
elections. Citizens do not periodically vote on membership of the EU and the 
European elections obviously cannot be considered as equivalent to national 
elections, because their aim is not that of choosing a European government.  
                                                 
2 The findings of these studies will be discussed in Chapter 2.  
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A different approach is thus required to study the effect of economic 
conditions on public opinion support for the EU and, as discussed above, the 
framework of the political economy of integration appears well suited to do so. 
This will be the topic of Chapter 2. 
 
Table 1. Referenda on European Issues in Member States  
Treaty/Policy Country Year Ratified (R)/Not 
Ratified (NR) 
Single European Act Denmark 1986 R 
 Ireland 1987 R 
Maastricht Denmark I 1992 NR 
 France 1992 R 
 Ireland 1992 R 
 Denmark II 1993 R 
Amsterdam Denmark 1998 R 
 Ireland 1998 R 
Nice Ireland I 2001 NR 
 Ireland II 2002 R 
Accession to the EU Austria 1994 R 
 Finland 1994 R 
 Norway 1994 NR 
 Sweden 1994 R 
 Czech Republic 2003 R 
 Estonia 2003 R 
 Hungary 2003 R 
 Latvia 2003 R 
 Lithuania 2003 R 
 Malta 2003 R 
 Poland 2003 R 
 Slovakia 2003 R 
 Slovenia 2003 R 
Adoption of the Euro Denmark 2000 NR 
 Sweden 2003 NR 
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European Constitution France 2005 NR 
 Luxembourg 2005 R 
 Netherlands 2005 NR 
 Spain 2005 R 
Source: European Commission 
 
Table 2. Referenda on Accession to the EU since the 1990s 
Country Year Ratified (R)/Not Ratified (NR) 
Austria  1994 R 
Finland 1994 R 
Norway 1994 NR 
Sweden 1994 R 
Czech Republic 2003 R 
Estonia 2003 R 
Hungary 2003 R 
Latvia 2003 R 
Lithuania 2003 R 
Malta 2003 R 
Poland 2003 R 
Slovakia 2003 R 
Slovenia 2003 R 
Source: European Commission 
 
 
3. Fiscal federalism and integration processes: the issue of competence 
allocation 
 
The public sector in nearly all countries consists of several different levels. 
Hence the basic issue is that of aligning responsibilities and fiscal instruments 
with the proper levels of government. This is the subject matter of fiscal 
federalism: as a subfield of public finance, it addresses the vertical structure of 
the public sector, in order to understand which functions and instruments are 
best centralised and which are best decentralised. In other words, fiscal 
 21
federalism explores, both in normative and positive terms, the roles of the 
different levels of government and the ways in which they relate to one another 
through such instruments as intergovernmental grants. It is appropriate to notice 
that the economic meaning of the term  "federalism" is somewhat different from 
the standard use in political science, where it is used with reference to a political 
system with a constitution guaranteeing some range of autonomy and power to 
both central and decentralised levels of government. For an economist, almost 
all public sectors are more or less federal, in the sense of having different levels 
of government which provide public services and have some scope for de-facto 
decision making (irrespective of the formal constitution). 
At the most general level, this theory contends that the general government 
should have the basic responsibility for the macroeconomic stabilisation 
function and for income redistribution in the form of assistance to the poor 
(Musgrave 1959). In both cases, the basic argument stems from some 
fundamental constraints on lower level governments. In the absence of 
monetary and exchange-rate prerogatives and with highly open economies that 
cannot contain much of the expansionary impact of fiscal stimuli, local 
governments simply have very limited means for traditional macroeconomic 
control of their economies. Similarly, the mobility of economic units can 
seriously constrain attempts to redistribute income. An aggressive local 
program for the support of low-income households, for instance, is likely to 
induce an influx of the poor and encourage an exodus of those with higher 
income, who have to bear the tax burden. In addition to these functions, the 
central government must provide certain "national" public goods (like national 
defence) which grant services to the entire population of the country. 
Decentralised levels of government should provide goods and services 
whose consumption is limited to their own jurisdictions. By tailoring outputs of 
such goods and services to the particular preferences and circumstances of 
their constituencies, decentralised provision increases economic welfare 
compared to the more uniform levels of such services which are likely under 
national provision.  
These precepts, however, should be regarded more as general guidelines 
than firm principles. Moreover, they do not offer a precise delineation of the 
specific goods and services to be provided at each level of government. In this 
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context, the appropriate degree of differentiation has still to be determined. A lot 
of factors have been taken into account in the literature, however the discussion 
of classical economists focuses primarily on heterogeneity of local preferences 
(as a criterion in favour of a decentralised provision) on the one hand, and 
economies of scale and spillover effects (as a criterion in favour of a centralised 
provision) on the other hand. 
Referring to the two central theorems of Oates (1972), namely the 
decentralisation theorem and the correspondence principle, the significance of 
heterogeneous preferences becomes clear. The decentralisation theorem is a 
normative proposition stating that 'in the absence of cost-savings from the 
centralized provision of a [local public] good and of inter-jurisdictional 
externalities, the level of welfare will always be at least as high (and typically 
higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of consumption are provided in each jurisdiction 
than if any single, uniform level of consumption is maintained across all 
jurisdictions' (Oates 1972, p.54). 
Following the argument of Quigley (1997), assume that all households in a 
given area must consume the same amounts of the goods, necessitating some 
compromise. With any diversity of need among the population, a division into 
smaller groups of the population would likely result in less compromise among 
the citizenry. When population groups are smaller, the demands of any 
randomly chosen household will be closer to the demand of the average 
household in the group. Economic welfare will thus be improved, as the 
provision of services for each group is closer to each member household’s 
optimum. Therefore, a uniform level of public services offered in each 
community is inappropriate. Pareto efficiency can be raised through fiscal 
decentralisation. Thus, governments should provide each public good including 
the respective set of individuals who consume the good: there is ‘‘perfect 
correspondence’’ in the provision of public goods (Oates 1972). Or as Cremer 
et al. (1994) put it, 'each type of good should be provided by a level of 
government […] enjoying a comparative advantage in accounting for the 
diversity of preferences in its choice of service delivery' (p.5). To sum it up: a 
strong case in favour of decentralisation can be deduced from the consideration 
of the diversity of local preferences.  
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However, meaningful critical remarks blur this clear recommendation. The 
realisation of economics of scale and the internalisation of external effects are 
the main decisive factors for the assignment of functional responsibilities to the 
central government level. We can observe that average costs can be reduced 
with increasing output quantities. This is an argument in favour of a central 
provision of such goods. However, dealing with public goods, decreasing as 
well as increasing (e.g., costs in congested urban areas) average cost functions 
can be detected when additional output is produced. Furthermore, even in the 
case of decreasing costs the centralisation recommendation is blurred: 
information costs for local citizens, the lack of accommodation and near usage 
as well as control costs for the central level have to be taken into the 
assignment calculus (Oates 1999) 
Coping with these externalities, different directions can be distinguished in 
the literature. On the one hand, the existence of interregional spillovers does 
not necessarily require the dispersion of the respective competence upwards to 
the central level, since grants-in-aid, fiscal transfers or horizontal co-operation 
among sovereign jurisdictions are valuable tools in order to internalise the 
externalities (Pigou 1932; Hemming and Spahn 1997; Quigley 1997). On the 
other hand, externalities arising from the provision of public goods vary 
immensely, from planet-wide in the case of global warming to local in the case 
of most city services. In order to internalise these multifaceted externalities, 
multi-level governance would be required (Hooghe and Marks 2001). 
Inman and Rubinfeld (1992) point out that public goods with significant 
cross-border externalities could also be provided by voluntary arrangements 
between member states. But (besides the fact that, at a minimum, a central 
government administrative structure will be needed to enforce the 
arrangements) efficient provision should not be expected. This so-called 
‘‘decentral policy failure’’ leads to a necessary condition regarding the 
centralisation decision: if the uncooperative behaviour of regions leads to worse 
results than the co-operative behaviour, and this co-operation is not credible 
without centralisation (because of free-rider effects), then the assignment to the 
central level would be necessary. This condition emblematises the famous 
principle of subsidiarity, which is inscribed in general terms in the Maastricht 
Treaty. 
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Another strand of the literature on fiscal federalism bears in mind the 
‘‘benchmark-effect’’ of a multi-level structured government system. 
Decentralised systems strengthen political and organisational (bottom-up) 
innovations and enforce competition between the different authorities (Sinn 
2003). They can realise efficiency gains by utilising their comparative 
advantages (Cremer et al. 1994) and by dividing labour efforts corresponding to 
the respective local resources.  
While the previous arguments point to a decentralised system, there are 
arguments in the literature which deal with negative effects of inter-jurisdictional 
competition. Combining the internalisation of externalities and the division of 
labour, the concept of ‘‘Functional Federalism’’ plays a crucial role. Frey and 
Eichenberger (1999) design the model of "Functional, Overlapping and 
Competing Jurisdictions" (FOCJs) in the following way: the number of 
jurisdictions is vast rather than limited; they are not aligned on just a few levels, 
but operate at diverse territorial scales; they are functionally specific rather than 
multi-task and flexible rather than fixed; they guarantee vast representative and 
direct-democratic rights to their citizens and levy own taxes.  
On the one hand, FOCJs allow reactions on the technological developments 
that change the spatial characteristics of public goods over time (Tanzi 1995), 
guarantee democratic control and fiscal equivalence (Ebel and Yilmaz 2002), 
cope with the correspondence principle of Oates (1972) and ‘‘are an institutional 
way to vary the size of the jurisdictions in order to minimize spillovers’’ (Frey 
and Eichenberger 1999, p.41). On the other hand, their establishment has to 
take organisational difficulties, economic costs (control, co-ordination, 
information, non-realised economies of scale) as well as a potential lack of 
transparency into account.  
Regarding these inconsistencies, the challenge of an optimal distribution of 
competencies cannot be simply satisfied establishing overlapping and task-
specific jurisdictions. Nevertheless, as Casella and Frey (1992) emphasise, 
‘‘even if an entire political system could not be organised solely through uni-
dimensional clubs, still the role of these clubs should not be undervalued’’ (p. 
645). 
The discussion so far has centred on centralisation and decentralisation 
inside a country, but it can be extended to encompass one more level of 
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government: the supranational one. The existence of international spillovers is a 
traditional argument in favour of international political integration and is related 
to the theory of fiscal federalism. Both Oates’ Decentralization Theorem and the 
subsidiarity principle (as enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty) state that the 
provision of public services should be located at the lowest level of government 
encompassing all benefits and costs. When there are important international 
spillovers, the natural implication of this theory is to delegate prerogatives to an 
international level of government (i.e. to form an international union) capable of 
internalizing all relevant externalities. This main idea is at the heart of several 
recent papers on political integration. Work along this line includes Alesina and 
Grilli (1993) and Alesina and Barro (2002) on monetary unions and Yi (1996) on 
custom unions. 
Alesina et al. (2001, 2005a) make some progress in merging the two 
literatures on fiscal federalism and on the political economy of international 
unions. They notice that the former usually takes the size of a union as given 
and assumes a uniform policy across countries, even if recent contributions by 
Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coate (2003) have started to explore 
alternative arrangements that do not impose policy uniformity, taking the size of 
the union as given. By contrast, the latter discusses the endogenous 
determination of the size of the union, assuming policy uniformity. 
Alesina et al. (2001, 2005a) propose a model of an international union as a 
group of countries deciding together the provision of certain public goods and 
policies because of international spillovers; the countries, however, are 
heterogeneous either in preferences and/or in economic fundamentals. These 
papers obtain a number of results. First, the size of spillovers between countries 
and the heterogeneity between their preferences or their economic 
fundamentals determines endogenously the size of the union and its 
composition. Even if multiple equilibria can arise because of strategic 
complementarities in the choice to join the union, under mild conditions all of 
these equilibria are characterized by countries with similar preferences, and the 
size of the union increases when the heterogeneity between countries is 
reduced or the spillovers increase. 
Second, the size of the union is inversely related to the spectrum of common 
policies which are centralized at the union level. That is, for given heterogeneity, 
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in equilibrium one obtains either small unions that coordinate a lot, or large 
unions in which very few functions are merged.  
Third, the political equilibrium implies a bias toward excessive centralization 
and small size of the union, unless there is a constitutional commitment of the 
union to centralize only certain policies. The source of this inefficiency is a time-
inconsistency problem: once the union is formed, a majority of members will 
want to increase the policy prerogatives of the union, and the expectation of this 
induces many countries to step back from the beginning. Therefore these 
results underscore the necessity of specifying ex ante a clear mandate for the 
union in a Constitutional stage. 
Finally, Alesina et al. (2005a) remove the assumption of policy uniformity 
and study simple rules that add flexibility and improve the allocation of 
resources. Their analysis focuses on arrangements which are central in the 
debate on the institutional design of the EU, like enhanced cooperation, 
subsidiarity, federal mandates and earmarked grants, and shows that such 
institutions partly reduce the trade-off between size and scope of the union. 
The main achievement of these models has been to build a formal 
framework to think about the political economy of political integration in the 
presence of spillovers in public goods provision. In general, this theory of 
formation of international unions literature has highlighted that the more the 
decision power is on national states and the larger the flexibility and the 
decentralization of the institutional setting, the more countries will be willing to 
join a union. Nevertheless, a large increase of flexibility and decentralization, by 
inducing coordination problems among member states, may harm the 
functioning of the union. 
These findings have relevant policy implications with regard to the EU. First, 
increasing the prerogatives attributed to the union (i.e. reducing the sovereignty 
of national states) should diminish its equilibrium size. Second, with a simple 
majority rule, the political equilibrium should imply a bias towards excessive 
centralization and small size of the union. Yet, the setting of these models is still 
too simple to be realistic. First, governments have several prerogatives that 
have different spillover effects on other countries. Second, politics in an 
integrated world (or in an international union) may differ from politics at the 
national level. 
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Indeed the experience of the EU of the last 50 years partly contradicts this 
theory. First, there seems to be a tendency to enlarge both the size and the 
scope of the union. The number of EU members has increased from 6 in 1957 
to 25 in 2004. Moreover, Alesina et al. (2005b) calculate that the effective 
number of prerogatives (i.e. policy areas where the EU has been active by 
producing legislation) has substantially increased in the same time span. 
Second, there is a partial inconsistency between this theory and the evidence 
on the allocation of competencies between the EU and national governments. 
Alesina et al. (2005b) show that the EU is active in areas where international 
spillovers are low and heterogeneities in countries’ preferences are large, such 
as agriculture, and it is not active in areas such as defence and foreign policy, 
where the opposite is true. 
In conclusion, it becomes evident that the basic trade-off between the 
realisation of scale effects and the internalisation of externalities, on the one 
hand, and the consideration of local preferences, on the other hand, creates 
meaningful tensions, which hamper clear recommendations for the practical 
assignment of policy tasks. Additionally, inter-jurisdictional competition, as well 
as politico-economic variables, affect normative assignment recommendations. 
Since the described theoretical trade-off impedes the derivation of clear and 
precise recommendations concerning the optimal degree and the effects of 
decentralisation, empirical analysis gets a crucial role. Therefore in Chapter 3 
we will examine the case of Italy from a political economy perspective and will 
analyse how policy competences are actually attributed to and exercised by the 
European, national and regional institutions.  
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter we have presented a survey of the recently developed 
theoretical literature on the political economy of integration and disintegration 
processes, with special emphasis on two highly relevant topics for European 
integration: the impact of economic costs and benefits from membership of an 
international union on public opinion and the allocation of competences among 
different level of governments. In doing so, we have also explored the links 
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between such literature and theories of fiscal federalism, with regard to 
normative considerations concerning the optimal allocation of competences in a 
union. 
To conclude, it must be acknowledged that the issue of integration or 
disintegration is much more complicated and that it has several other relevant 
dimensions like differences in language, culture, ethnicity, etc. which are not 
addressed in this literature. However, as Drazen (2000) argues, "it would be too 
much to suggest that economists should incorporate the range of important 
political and sociological factors into models of nation formation. The theory of 
comparative advantage suggests this is a bad idea, not only because 
economists would be treading on ground with which they are largely unfamiliar, 
but also because what economists do have to offer to understanding the 
number and size of nations would be obscured" (p.709). 
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CHAPTER 2: SCALE VERSUS HETEROGENEITY: HOW THE 
ECONOMY AFFECTS PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE EU IN 
MEMBER COUNTRIES 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The role of public opinion in the process of European economic and political 
integration has so far been neglected by economists, whereas international 
relations scholars have been paying it increasing attention in the last fifteen 
years, because the implementation of international bargains struck by 
governments often requires domestic support, as the use of referendum in 
some member states clearly demonstrates. What are the factors that influence 
public opinion support for the European Union (EU)? We assume that citizens 
are in favour of membership if they receive economic benefits from it. To 
develop this idea, we propose a simple political economic model drawing on the 
recent economic literature on integration and disintegration processes. The 
basic element is the existence of a trade-off between the benefits of 
centralisation and the costs of harmonising policies in presence of 
heterogeneous preferences among countries. 
Afterwards we empirically test the model with data on the EU; more 
precisely, we perform an econometric analysis employing a panel of member 
countries over time. The second part of the paper therefore tries to answer the 
following question: does public opinion support for the EU really depend on 
economic factors? The findings broadly confirm that economic benefits and 
costs do consistently shape citizens’ attitude towards EU membership, even if 
some differences over time and across countries can be noted. Consequently, 
the key to regain the significant amount of support lost in the last fifteen years is 
to be found in economic policies effectively promoting growth and employment. 
Our analysis may thus shed some light also on the awkward process of 
ratification of the European Constitution. Citizens in many member states are 
called to express their opinion in national referenda, which may well end up in 
rejection of the Constitution, as recently happened in France and the 
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Netherlands, triggering a European-wide political crisis. These events show that 
nowadays understanding public attitude towards the EU is not only of academic 
interest, but has a strong relevance for policy-making too. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a concise historical 
overview of the evolution of public support for the EU. Section 3 presents a 
political economic model of citizens’ support for membership of an international 
union like the EU. Section 4 presents the estimation of the model and its results. 
Section 5 discusses the relevance of our findings for the present debate about 
ratification of the European Constitution and the future of public attitude towards 
the EU. Section 6 briefly concludes. 
 
2. Public Opinion Attitude Towards European Integration 
 
Comparative public opinion research is often subject to a host of potential 
problems involving the measurement of citizens’ opinions: variations in question 
wording across different studies; irregularity in the timing or frequency of surveys; 
changes in sampling frame or survey procedures, and so on. In the case of public 
support for European integration, the unparalleled resources of the Eurobarometer 
surveys enable us to avoid these problems. Indeed, since 1973 the European 
Commission has regularly undertaken these semiannual European-wide opinion 
polls (in spring and in autumn)3, conducted by private polling agencies in each 
member state through interviews of a sample of approximately 1000 people in 
each country (Gabel 1998b; Hix 1999) 
The Eurobarometer surveys ask a series of identical questions about public 
support for the EU and the integration process. We can therefore analyse public 
attitudes towards the EU, using a standard question that has been regularly 
repeated in each of the EU member states. This permits meaningful cross-
national and cross-temporal comparisons of data. Throughout this paper, we 
will use the following measure of public support for the EU: the percentage of 
people answering ‘a good thing’ to the question: ‘Generally speaking, do you 
think that (your country’s) membership of the European Union/Community is a 
good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad?’  
                                                 
3 In the following figures, the suffix S after a date will indicate ‘spring issue’ and the suffix A ‘autumn 
issue’ of the Eurobarometer surveys. 
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Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the percentages of EU citizens supporting 
their country’s membership of the EU, from autumn 1973 to autumn 2003, and 
claiming that their country has benefited from EU membership, from spring 
1984 (when a question about membership benefits started to be regularly 
asked) to autumn 2003. No single trend for the whole period can be detected. 
Support for membership was slightly declining over the 1970s and reached a 
minimum of 50% in 1981, then it rose significantly throughout the 1980s, 
reaching an historical maximum of 72% in 1991. Afterwards, it fell dramatically 
down to 46% in 19974, then it followed an erratic path within a 48-55% range. 
The most significant emerging from Figure 1 is that opinions about benefits 
followed a very similar path: actually the correlation coefficient between the two 
series is 0.84. 
Indeed, the EU has had and still has, first, an economic nature. However, 
economic integration has not made member states irrelevant in the eyes of 
public opinion. To evaluate the impact of EU activity on their well-being, citizens 
of, say, Italy are not interested in the economic performance of the EU as a 
whole, but in that of the Italian economy. Despite the integrated nature of the 
European market and of some EU policy programs, therefore, the performance 
of the market is still measured at the national level.  
Public opinion support for European integration is thus influenced by factors 
that occur at the national level. With a metaphor, one might say that the image 
of the EU is filtered through national lenses. More precisely, the hypothesis is 
that citizens of a member state realise that the EU does affect their economic 
welfare and they make it a target of their evaluation, which, however, is based 
on the performance of their national economy. Support for the EU is higher 
(lower) when the national economy is doing well (badly). In other words, it is 
assumed that public opinion perceives that the national economy is influenced 
by membership of the EU.5 
The EU average support, indeed, hides very large differences among 
countries6. If we look at countries’ average support for membership in the 1973-
                                                 
4 The entry of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995 (three countries showing a very low level of support 
for membership) significantly contributed to reducing the EU average. 
5 This assumption does not require public opinion to have an exact knowledge of how the EU works and 
what its competencies and activity are, which would be definitely unrealistic. 
6 Luxembourg is not included in the analysis conducted in this paper, because of its very small size. 
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2004 period (or since their entry, if they became members after 1973), a 
differentiated picture emerges (Figure 2). The Netherlands and Italy hold the 
first ranks (76% and 70% respectively) with a large lead over the other 
members. Support in the founding members7, the three Mediterranean 
countries which entered the EU in the 1980s (Greece, Portugal and Spain) and 
Ireland exceeds the EU average (57%), whereas the lowest values (from 35 to 
40%) are registered by the UK and the protagonists of the 1995 enlargement 
(Austria, Finland and Sweden). 
 
Figure 1. Support for and benefit from EU membership according to the 
Eurobarometer opinion polls (EU average) 
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‘Taking everything into consideration, would you say that [your country] has on balance 
benefited or not from being a member of the European Community/European Union?’ 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer, various issues 
                                                 
7 Germany represents an exception, because its average level of support is slightly lower than that of the 
EU as a whole (55% against 57%). However, this is largely the effect of reunification, since 
Eurobarometer data shows that support is much higher in West Germany (the founding member in 1957) 
than in East Germany. 
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Figure 2. Average support for EU membership* (%) 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
NED ITA IRL POR SPA BEL GRE FRA EU GER DEN FIN UK AUT SWE
 
*1973-2004 average for Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland 
and the UK; 1981-2004 average for Greece; 1986-2004 average for Portugal and Spain; 1995-
2004 average for Austria, Finland and Sweden  
Source: own calculations based on Standard Eurobarometer data 
 
To complete the picture, we may analyse the dynamics of public support for 
membership in each country and compare them to that for the EU as a whole. 
The figures for each country are in Appendix 1 and show that, even if with 
different intensities, all member states seem to follow a common pattern, similar 
to that already identified for the EU average. Table 1 reports the values of an 
index of “relative intensity” of support for EU membership, which describes 
concisely the results of comparison between national and EU levels of support. 
It is defined as the ratio between the number of surveys in which the level of 
support registered in country i was higher than the EU average and the total 
number of surveys. It may range between 0 (if support was always lower than 
the EU average) and 1 (if support was always higher than the EU average).  
Only Italy and the Netherlands (the most “europhile” countries in press 
jargon) reach 1, while the UK, Austria, Finland and Sweden (the most 
“eurosceptical” countries) score 0. This mirrors the situation previously 
described in Figure 1 and does not come as a surprise. More interestingly, even 
countries showing, on average, a very high level of support for the EU, like 
Belgium, Portugal or Ireland, have experienced some moments of relatively low 
support. For instance, Belgium scores 0.81, which means that its support was 
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lower than the EU average in roughly one survey out of five. Conversely, a 
traditionally “eurosceptical” member like Denmark actually scored better than 
the EU average in almost thirty per cent of times. On the whole, the index of 
relative intensity confirms that the countries with a more favourable attitude 
towards the EU are the founding members and the Mediterranean countries, 
plus Ireland. 
 
Table 1. Relative intensity of support for EU membership 
Country Value 
ITALY 1,00 
NETHERLANDS 1,00 
BELGIUM 0,81 
PORTUGAL 0,81 
SPAIN 0,73 
GREECE 0,68 
IRELAND 0,63 
FRANCE 0,52 
GERMANY 0,42 
DENMARK 0,29 
UK 0,00 
AUSTRIA 0,00 
FINLAND 0,00 
SWEDEN 0,00 
 
Source: own calculations based on Standard Eurobarometer data 
 
 
3. The Model 
 
3.1 The basic model 
 
The approach I will follow is that of the recent literature on the political 
economy of international unions and the unification or break-up of nations 
(Alesina and Spolaore 1997, Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina and Wacziarg 
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1999, Alesina et al. 2001, 2005a, to mention only the most relevant). Here I 
emphasise some basic features which may be relevant to the modelling of 
public opinion support for the EU. The general perspective is that unification 
provides returns to scale in the provision of public goods, but reduces each 
member state’s ability to determine its most favoured bundle of public goods. 
These papers focus on a trade-off between the benefits of centralization, arising 
from economies of scale or externalities, and the costs of harmonizing policies 
as a consequence of the increased heterogeneity of individual preferences in a 
union. Alesina et al. (2001) argue that ‘the core of our model, and an element 
that in our view is central to the political economy of all unions [...], is the 
existence of a tension between the heterogeneity of individual countries’ 
preferences and the advantage of taking certain decision in common’ (p. 4). 
Bolton and Roland (1997) employ heterogeneity in economic fundamentals 
(income or productivity) and distortionary taxation to study the conditions under 
which a majority in favour of secession (or unification) arises in the regions of a 
democratic country. Alesina et al. (2001, 2005a) analyse the determinants of 
the degree of centralisation and the size of international unions by modelling a 
union as a group of countries deciding together on the provision of public goods 
or policies which produce a spillover effect across members.  
These papers do not deal explicitly with the issue of mass support for 
membership of an international union, but their reasoning can be extended to 
include it. The public goods can be interpreted in a broad sense as common 
policies (not only in the economic field, but also in areas like social policy or 
defence), where for each country the benefits of centralisation derive from the 
exploitation of economies of scale or externalities, while the costs are 
represented by the loss of independent policy-making. 
Actually, the promise of increased prosperity and employment through the 
gains from free trade has been the most prominent argument offered in support 
of the original Common Market and then the Single Market: producers and 
consumers would gain access, respectively, to larger markets and to a greater 
variety of products (Tsoukalis 1997, Gabel 1998a). As argued by Eichenberg 
and Dalton (1993), ‘if the EC has promised anything, it has promised the 
enhancement of member states’ national economic welfare’ (p. 510). 
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At the same time, countries may have different preferences with regard to 
certain kinds of policies. Social policy is a good example; large differences in 
the level of protection offered by national welfare systems can be observed, 
which have led many economists and sociologists to identify different 
“European social models” (Esping-Andersen 1990, Sapir 2006). In such cases a 
centralised solution entails a net cost for citizens and thus reduces support for 
EU membership. 
The model presented in this section is a modified version of that proposed 
by Bolton and Roland (1997) explicitly taking heterogeneity in preferences 
among countries into account. While they focus on a country made up of two 
regions, I consider here a union composed of n countries. The population and 
capital in a generic member country i are indicated by Li and Ki; total national 
output Yi and per capita output yi are given respectively by:  
 
α
i
α
ii LKY
-1=   and αi
i
i
i kL
Y
y ==            (1) 
 
I assume perfectly competitive labour and capital markets in each country i. 
Productive factors are mobile inside countries, but not across them. Therefore 
the equilibrium real rate of return on capital ri and the equilibrium real wage si 
are: 
 
ri = α(yi/ki)  and  si = (1-α)yi       (2) 
 
Individuals differ in their labour and capital endowment; hence an individual 
v in country i will have an income of: 
 
wvi = siLvi + riKvi         (3) 
The income distribution in each country i is given by a density function zi(wv); 
thus ∑ )(=)(
i
viv wzwz  is the income distribution in the whole union, with support 
],0[ w . Total output equals total income: 
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0
)(=         (4) 
 
The differences between regions are fully summed up by differences in factor 
returns (determined by the absence of factor mobility) and in income 
distribution. 
The assumption of factor immobility may sound quite inaccurate in the case 
of an international union like the EU and thus needs explaining. First, labour 
mobility among EU countries is actually very low (Hantrais 2000). Capital 
mobility is much more intense, but it can be easily shown that introducing it in 
our framework would lead to more unrealistic results. Indeed capital mobility 
would imply that ri = r for any i=1,..., n. Since it follows from (1) and (2) that 
1-= αii kαr , then we would obtain equal capital-output ratio k, equal per capita 
income y and equal wage s in all countries in equilibrium, while distribution of 
income could still differ among countries. At present, by contrast, we observe 
very large differences in per capita income, even when expressed in purchasing 
power parity, among EU countries: the richest member country (Luxembourg) is 
about five times more wealthy than the poorest one (Latvia)8. Second, and most 
important, the fundamental element characterising the union in this model is the 
common provision of a public good Gu, which does not require factor mobility to 
be implemented. 
Following Alesina et al. (2001), Gu can be interpreted in a broad sense as a 
common policy (not only in the economic field, but also in areas like social 
policy or defence), where for each country the benefits of centralisation derive 
from the exploitation of economies of scale or externalities, while the costs are 
represented by the loss of independent policy-making. 
The provision of the public good is financed with a linear income tax; in per 
capita terms, this implies: 
 
gu = tuyu             (5) 
 
                                                 
8 If one only takes the "old" fifteen members into account, Luxembourg is about three times richer than 
the poorest country (Portugal).  
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where tu is the union’s tax rate. An individual’s utility is defined over the 
consumption of a private good cvi and the public good gu. To keep things as 
simple as possible, the individual utility function assumes the following form:  
 
)log(+log=)(+)(=),( uiviuvivuvi
IN
vi gβcgHcugcU      (6) 
 
where the superscript IN means “when country i is a member of the union”. 
]1,0[∈iβ is a parameter capturing the heterogeneity in preferences over the 
public good among countries. The lower βi, the higher the cost deriving from the 
loss of independent policy-making for country i.9   
The most preferred per capita amount of public good for an individual with 
income wvi is given by the solution to the following problem: 
 
 
[ ])log(+logmax uivi
g
gβc          (7) 
s.t. cvi = (1-tu)wvi and gu = tuyu        (8) 
 
By substituting (8) in (7), we find that the optimum per capita amount of public 
good is: 
 
2
=)(* uviu
y
wg            (9) 
 
which is independent of wvi and therefore the same for all individuals in the 
union. Hence (9) is the per capita amount of public good provided by the union, 
with an equilibrium tax rate of 0.5. An agent with income wvi receives the 
following payoff when his country is inside the union: 
 
uivivi
IN
vi yβwwU log+log+log=)( -2log2     (10) 
 
                                                 
9 Alternatively, we may think of βi as of the extent of the spillover effect in the provision of the public 
good at the union level. In this case, the higher βi, the higher the benefits of centralisation. 
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Now we have to find what the utility of the individuals would be if country i 
were not a member of the union. In such case, the public good gi is 
autonomously provided in country i and therefore there are no heterogeneity 
costs. However, the absence of integration carries a different kind of cost: an 
efficiency loss for the national economy, since potential benefits from 
international coordination are missing. For instance, imagine the simple case of 
a free trade area: as noticed by Bolton and Roland (1997), production costs and 
consumer prices in a country may be higher when it is outside the union than 
when it is inside, because its trade with the members of the free trade area is 
lower. To put it bluntly, the better (worse) the performance of the national 
economy inside the union, the higher (lower) the cost that being outside the 
union would entail. 
To model this effect, I assume that outside the union individuals get a pre-
tax income of only λviw , where ]1,0[∈λ  is a parameter (the same for all 
countries) capturing the efficiency loss from autarchy: the lower λ, the greater 
the loss. The individual utility function now takes the following form: 
 
iviivi
OUT
vi gcgcU log+log=),(             (11) 
 
The most preferred per capita amount of public good for an individual with 
income wvi is given by the solution to the following problem: 
 
 
[ ]ivi
g
gc loglogmax +         (12) 
s.t. λviivi wtc )-1(=   and gi = tiyi      (13) 
 
By substituting (13) in (12), we find that the optimum per capita amount of public 
good is: 
 
2
=)(* ivii
y
wg           (14) 
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which is independent of wvi and therefore the same for all individuals in country 
i. Hence (14) is the per capita amount of public good autonomously provided by 
country i. Consequently the equilibrium tax rate is again 0.5. An agent with 
income wvi receives the following payoff when his country is outside the union: 
 
ivivi
OUT
vi ywλwU log+log=)( -2log2      (15) 
 
An individual with income wvi supports his country’s membership of the 
union when )(>)( vi
OUT
vivi
IN
vi wUwU . Since )( vi
IN
vi wU - )( vi
OUT
vi wU is always 
increasing in wvi, it follows that a majority of individuals supports membership of 
the union if so does the agent with the median income (the median voter).  
The median voter in country i has the following utility when his country is 
inside the union 
 
uimi
IN
mi yβwU log+log+log= -2log2      (16) 
 
whereas his utility if country i is outside the union is given by: 
 
imi
OUT
mi ywλU log+log= -2log2      (17) 
 
Hence the median voter prefers his country to be inside the union than outside it 
when 
 
IN
miUΔ = -
OUT
miU = (1- λ)logwmi + logβi + logyu – logyi >0   (18) 
We can rewrite (18) as: 1>0>
-1
i
ui
λ
mi
y
yβw
Δ ⇔ .  It is straightforward to notice 
that Δ is increasing in the union’s average per capita income yu , the parameter 
βi and the median voter’s income wmi  and decreasing in country i’s average per 
capita income yi  and the efficiency parameter λ.  
A particular situation arises if we assume λ=1 and βi =1 (no efficiency loss 
nor heterogeneity). In this case we obtain the following result: 
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PROPOSITION 1. If λ=1 and βi =1, a majority of country i’s citizens is in favour 
of membership if yu>yi, i.e. if country i is poorer than the union’s average.  
 
This happens because of an implicit redistribution effect in the provision (and 
financing) of the public good in the union; from (9) and (14), we find indeed that 
** >⇒> iuiu ggyy . Poorer countries receive a higher per capita amount of 
public good inside the union than outside it while paying the same fraction of 
their income in taxes10; the reverse is true for richer-than-average countries. 
Hence the difference constitutes an implicit transfer from the latter to the former. 
 
3.2 Endogenous heterogeneity 
 
So far the heterogeneity parameter β has been treated as exogenous for 
simplicity. Here I extend the model by assuming a relation between the degree 
of heterogeneity in preferences among members of the union and the amount of 
public good gu. The new utility function of an individual v becomes:  
 
))(log(+log=),( uuviuvi
IN
vi ggβcgcU       (19) 
 
I hypothesize that β(gu) is the same for all countries in the union and is 
decreasing in the per capita amount of public good supplied by the union. The 
idea is that countries’ preferences become more heterogeneous when more 
competences are attributed to the union. This assumption seems consistent 
with the historical evidence of European integration (Alesina et al. 2005b). On 
this subject, Alesina and Wacziarg (1999) argue that ‘[Since the early 1990s] we 
have witnessed increased skepticism concerning European unification on the 
part of the voters. This could be viewed as resistance, on the part of 
heterogeneous constituencies, to attempts to impose excessive uniformity over 
an increasing range of policies over Europe’ (p. 28). It is worth noting that such 
a kind of preference heterogeneity is different from that stemming from an 
                                                 
10 Remember that the tax rate is 0.5 in both cases. 
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enlargement of the union, which has been dealt with by Alesina et al. (2001, 
2005a) and is frequently mentioned in the present political and economic 
debate about European integration. Here we emphasise that an international 
union may become more heterogeneous not only because new members join it, 
but also simply as a consequence of deeper integration in sectors where policy 
preferences differ among countries. 
We choose the following functional form for β(gu): 
 
u
u g
gβ
+1
1
=)(              (20) 
 
which is monotonically decreasing in gu, with 1=)(lim ug
gβ
0→  and 0=)(lim ug gβ∞→ , 
and thus respects the constraint ]1,0[∈β . By substituting (20) in (19) and 
maximizing with respect to gu, we find: 
 
1-)+1(=)(* uwiu ywg          (21) 
 
which is again independent of wvi and therefore the same for all individuals in 
the union. *ug  is clearly increasing in yu, but, if we compare (21) to (9), we 
discover that, for all values of yu, it is lower in the case of endogenous 
heterogeneity than in that of exogenous heterogeneity. Not surprisingly, a 
positive relation between heterogeneity and centralization reduces the amount 
of public good supplied by the union in equilibrium. Consequently, the new tax 
rate is: 
 
u
u
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y
t
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which is lower than the previous value of 0.5 for all positive values of yu. 
From (20) and (21), the value of β(gu) in
*
ug  is:  
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As in section 3 above, we calculate the utility of country i’s median voter:    
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His utility when country i is outside the union does not change. Hence a majority 
of citizens of i is in favour of membership of the union when: 
 
2log2+log-
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Inspection of (24) provides the following result: 
 
PROPOSITION 2. Support of membership of the union is increasing in the 
union’s average income and decreasing in country i’s average income and in 
the efficiency parameter λ.  
 
Proof 
It is straightforward to check that  0<∂
∂
iy
Δ
 and  0<
λ
Δ
∂
∂
. 
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            (25) 
To establish that 0>∂
∂
uy
Δ
, first notice that the denominator is clearly positive 
for all yu>0. Define the numerator as 1+)1-(+1=)( uuu yyyf . It is easy to 
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check that 0=)0(f  and 0,0>
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Thus we have 0>)( uyf  for all yu>0,  which implies 0>∂
∂
uy
Δ
. QED. 
 
In the model of the previous section, an individual received a higher amount 
of g inside the union than outside it when his country was poorer than the 
union’s average. With endogenous heterogeneity, we have already observed 
that the amount of public good provided by the union and the tax rate are lower 
in equilibrium. From (21) and (14), in order to have , now it must be 
: a country needs to be much poorer than the average to get a 
higher amount of g from the union.   
To summarize, the qualitative nature of our findings does not change 
dramatically when endogenous heterogeneity is introduced in the model: 
support for membership of the union is still increasing in the union’s average 
income and decreasing in country i’s average income and in the efficiency 
parameter λ. The quantitative implications, however, point to a reduced scope 
of the union. 
 
 
4. Econometric analysis 
 
In the last fifteen years, citizens’ support for European integration has been 
investigated empirically in a number of studies, which can be divided into two 
different categories, according to the focus of their analysis: individuals or 
countries. The former include the works by, among others, Gabel and Palmer 
(1995), Anderson and Reichert (1996), Anderson (1998), Gabel (1998), which 
took personal economic and social factors into account and identified 
systematic differences in individual-level support for integration related to 
partisanship, age, income, occupation, cognitive skills and political values . 
However, we are primarily interested in the latter strand of literature, 
because our focus too is on cross-national determinants of support. The two 
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most prominent examples of this kind of studies are Eichenberg and Dalton 
(1993) and Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996). Both used a panel data 
approach. Eichenberg and Dalton analysed eight countries (the founding 
members, except for Luxembourg, plus Denmark, Ireland and the UK) for the 
1973-88 period, using a number of economic and political variables to explain 
the dynamics of public support for EU membership. They found a significant 
effect of inflation, but not of unemployment nor of GDP. Anderson and 
Kaltenthaler examined a larger number of countries (twelve) for a slightly longer 
time period (1973-93) and found that also unemployment (besides inflation) was 
significant, while GDP growth remained insignificant. Interestingly, they 
highlighted an upward trend in support; this is not surprising, because, as 
shown in Figure 1, the period taken into account ended when public support for 
the EU had reached its all-time high and was just starting to decline.  
The main aim of this section is not simply to update those previous studies, 
but to test our model with a view to providing a more complete and theoretically 
grounded picture of public support for the EU. According to our model, national 
economic conditions do influence citizens’ attitude towards European 
integration, since membership of the EU increases the efficiency of the national 
economy. Therefore, a good economic performance positively affects public 
support for the EU. We follow the previous studies in choosing three variables 
as basic indicators of national economic performance: GDP growth, 
unemployment rate and inflation rate. We also add public debt and public 
deficit, which, especially after the signature of the Maastricht Treaty, have 
become increasingly relevant to public opinion's eyes in determining whether 
the management of public finances is sound or poor. GDP growth is expected to 
exert a positive impact, whereas unemployment, inflation, public debt and public 
deficit should have a negative effect.11  
However, two are the really novel elements of the model. First, it indicates 
that support for EU membership depends negatively on the ratio between 
national per capita income and the EU average one: the poorer a country 
                                                 
11 Inequality would have been another interesting variable to be incorporated in the estimations. However, 
we could not do so because all the series of the various measures of inequality provided by Eurostat (the 
Gini index, the at-risk-of-poverty rate and the ratio of the richest to the poorest quintile of the population) 
were incomplete and presented a large number of breaks.   
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(compared to the other EU members), the more positive its citizens’ attitude 
towards EU membership.   
Second, the model explicitly includes preference heterogeneity among 
member countries. It is not obvious how to measure it, hence we adopt two 
different strategies to do so. Firstly, we propose a simple measure consistent 
with our model, where we defined a  parameter β which captured heterogeneity 
over the provision of a public good (β=1 meant complete homogeneity, while 
β=0 implied complete heterogeneity). By analogy with it, we take public 
expenditure as a proxy for the public good and thus construct the following 
indicator:  
 
EXPEND = (1 - |Gi-GEU|)*100                (26) 
 
defined as one minus the absolute value of the difference between the ratio 
of public expenditure to GDP in country i (Gi) and the EU average (GEU), 
expressed in percentage terms. It takes a maximum value of 100 if Gi = GEU; 
the farther the value of Gi from that of GEU (irrespective of whether it is larger or 
smaller), the lower EXPEND is. Since a higher degree of heterogeneity should 
reduce support for the EU, its coefficient is expected to have a positive sign. 
Secondly, we also generate a more indirect proxy variable capturing 
preference heterogeneity: we group member countries according to their date of 
accession to the EU and attribute each group a different score. The basic 
argument runs as follows. The founding states created the European 
Community, shaped its institutions and its policies (such as the Common 
Agricultural Policy) and then pressed for the advancement of the integration 
process after the accession of new members. Therefore we may assume that, 
among all member states, their preferences have been the most similar to the 
policies actually enacted by the EU throughout its existence.  
By contrast, public opinion was less favourably predisposed towards 
integration in the countries entering the EU in 197312; the ‘permissive 
consensus’ mentioned in Chapter 1 (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970), did not 
                                                 
12 The extreme case was Norway, which, after signing the accession treaty, rejected EU membership by 
referendum. 
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exist in those countries, thus constraining elites’ aspirations to join early (Rabier 
1989, Reif and Inglehart 1991). Moreover, even after quite a long period of 
membership, they chose to opt out of some new common policies: the UK and 
Denmark have not adopted the euro and the UK and Ireland are not part of the 
“Schengen area”. The Mediterranean countries joining in the 1980s are different 
still: they entered late not because of a lack of enthusiasm for the EU as an 
organisation, but because they were  previously excluded for political reasons, 
since until the mid-1970s they were run by undemocratic governments. Finally, 
the 1995 enlargement brought in three countries that had previously resisted 
accession to the EU for almost forty years and whose publics have shown a 
very low level of support for EU membership; hence, their preferences are 
assumed to be the most different from those of the founding members.   
Consequently, we attribute a score of 4 to the five founding members, 3 to 
Greece, Portugal and Spain, 2 to Denmark, Ireland and the UK, and 1 to 
Austria, Finland and Sweden. The sign of the coefficient of this new variable 
(labelled ENTRY) is expected to be positive; this is analogous to what 
happened in our theoretical model, where a higher β indicated a higher degree 
of preference homogeneity. Certainly this definition of heterogeneity is quite 
crude; moreover, alternative criteria for the division of countries into groups 
might be suggested. Nevertheless, our choice seems consistent with the 
historical development of the European integration process.  
After defining the relevant variables, the estimation of the model was carried 
out  employing two different panel datasets, the first comprising all the EU 
member states (except for Luxembourg) for the 1995-2003 period, the second 
covering a smaller number of countries (the five founding members, Denmark, 
Ireland and the UK), but a longer time span (1978-2003)13. All the results 
reported here were obtained using EViews 5.0. The model can be specified as 
follows: 
 
MEMBi,t = α + β1GROWTHi,t + β2UNEMPLi,t + β3INFLi,t + β4DEBTi,t + 
β5DEFICITi,t +    + β6GDP_RATIOi,t + β7EXPENDi,t + β8ENTRYi + εi,t 
i=1,..,N   t=1,...,T                                    (27) 
                                                 
13 Eurobarometer data start in 1973. However, quarterly GDP figures for Denmark were only available 
since 1978. Thus, in order to have a balanced panel, our sample starts in 1978. 
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where  
MEMBi,t is the percentage of people supporting their country’s membership of 
the EU, as defined in Section 2;  
GROWTHi,t is the quarterly real GDP growth rate
14 in country i, in the quarter 
prior to that in which the Eurobarometer survey was conducted, expressed in 
percentage terms; 
UNEMPLi,t is the unemployment rate in country i, in the quarter prior to that in 
which the Eurobarometer survey was conducted, expressed in percentage 
terms; 
INFLi,t is the quarterly inflation rate
15 in country i, in the quarter prior to that in 
which the Eurobarometer survey was conducted, expressed in percentage 
terms; 
DEBTi,t is the ratio of country i’s general government consolidated gross debt to 
GDP in the year in which the Eurobarometer survey was conducted, expressed 
in percentage terms;  
DEFICITi,t is the ratio of country i’s general government net borrowing to GDP in 
the year in which the Eurobarometer survey was conducted, expressed in 
percentage terms; 
GDP_RATIOi,t is the ratio of country i’s real per capita GDP to the EU average, 
in the quarter prior to that in which the Eurobarometer survey was conducted, 
expressed in percentage terms; 
EXPENDi,t is the measure of heterogeneity in public expenditure defined above; 
ENTRYi (as specified above) takes a value of 4 for the five founding members, 
3 for Greece, Portugal and Spain, 2 for Denmark, Ireland and the UK, and 1 for 
Austria, Finland and Sweden; 
εi,t  is the error term; 
N is the number of cross-sectional units (countries); 
T is the number of time points. 
                                                 
14 The model was also estimated using annual (instead of quarterly) GDP growth rates, obtaining very 
similar results. 
15 Measured as the consumer price index (CPI) growth rate. 
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Since the Eurobarometer surveys are carried out in spring and autumn 
(corresponding to the second and four quarter), first- and third-quarter figures 
were employed for GROWTH, UNEMPL, INFL and GDP_RATIO. Details about 
data sources are reported in Table 2. 
Given the structure of the dataset, we expected to have to deal with some 
problems in the estimation process: cross-sectional heteroskedasticity, 
contemporaneous correlations of the residuals for different cross-sectional 
units16 and autocorrelated residuals within each time series. Diagnostic tests for 
results from an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of  Equation (27) 
confirmed the presence of such problems.17  
 
 
Table 2. Data sources 
Variable Source 
MEMB European Commission, Eurobarometer surveys, various issues.  
GROWTH OECD, Economic Outlook, No 75. Figures for Denmark are from 
Eurostat New Cronos database. All data are expressed at 1995 prices. 
UNEMPL OECD, Economic Outlook, No 75.  
INFL IMF, International Financial Statistics 
DEBT Eurostat, Government Statistics 
DEFICIT See DEBT 
GDP_RATIO See GROWTH 
BALANCE European Commission, Annual Report on Allocated Expenditure, 
various issues 
EXPEND See DEBT 
 
A strategy frequently followed in political economy literature is the 
application of a feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) estimator, which 
corrects, on the one hand, for both cross-section heteroskedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlations, and, on the other hand, for autocorrelations of 
the errors by assuming that they follow a first-order autoregressive process 
(AR(1)):  
                                                 
16 By contemporaneous correlations, we mean that the residuals for unit i at time t are correlated with the 
residuals for unit j at time t. In our context, a relevant example could be a similar business cycle between 
two or more EU countries. 
17 See Wooldridge (2002) and Greene (2003) for a detailed description of tests for hetroskedasticity, 
contemporaneous correlations and autocorrelation in panel data models.  
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εi,t = σiεi,t-1+ ui,t    |σi|<1                    (28) 
 
This methodology was firstly proposed by Parks (1967) and is often referred 
to as the Parks estimator. However, it presents a potentially severe pitfall: Beck 
and Katz (1995) show that, unless T is much larger than N, the FGLS 
methodology tends to strongly underestimate the true variability of the 
estimator. Consequently, this produces highly overconfident standard errors 
and, therefore, t-ratios are much higher than the correct value. They suggest a 
different strategy: first, use OLS and the appropriate covariance matrix to obtain 
standard errors which are robust to contemporaneous correlations as well as 
different error variances in each cross-section (labelled “panel corrected 
standard errors”); second, impose the restriction of equal autocorrelation 
coefficients across units (σi=σ for all i).  
Hence we estimated Equation (27) for the EU-14, where T=16 and N=14, by 
pooled OLS with panel corrected standard errors (provided by EViews following 
Beck and Katz methodology) and an AR(1) correction. For the EU-8 equation, 
where T=50 and N=8, we employed both this methodology and (since in this 
case T is actually much larger than N) a FGLS specification correcting for both 
cross-section heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlations of the 
errors, termed “Cross-section SUR” by EViews, because it is analogous to a 
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) framework18. The latter approach is 
also very similar to that adopted by Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) and 
Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) and thus facilitates comparison with their 
findings.  
The results for the EU-14 clearly confirm our theoretical predictions (Table 
3). Both the positive impact of economic growth and the negative one of 
unemployment are significant, even if the former is stronger than the latter, as 
shown by comparison of their t-ratios. Inflation does not seem to be of concern 
for the European public opinion, probably because it has permanently been low 
throughout the period considered in our analysis. Economic growth and 
unemployment are thus the variables of the business cycle that matter most in 
                                                 
18 The AR(1) correction with a common σ is retained. 
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citizens’ view. By contrast, price stability appears to be taken for granted, even 
if one may argue that its achievement has represented precisely one of the 
main successes of economic integration, through monetary policy coordination 
in the European Monetary System and the three phases of the European 
Monetary Union, leading to a single monetary policy run by the ECB for most 
EU members since 1999. Public debt seems to matter more than public deficit 
to European citizens: the negative effect of the former is significant (even if not 
very large) whilst that of the latter is not. As shown in Table 3, we estimated 
Equation (27) with both EXPEND and ENTRY and with only one of them at a 
time. When only EXPEND was included, we also performed a regression 
including country fixed effects.19 There are no considerable differences among 
the various specifications and this is reassuring as regards the stability of the 
results. The degree of preference homogeneity has a strongly positive effect on 
support for membership, confirming the predictions of the theoretical model.  
The coefficient of GDP_RATIO is negative and highly significant: ceteris 
paribus, the poorer a country the higher its support for the EU, as we expected. 
This may happen because of the redistribution enacted in the EU budget in 
favour of the less developed members to promote the goal of economic and 
social cohesion by means of the Structural Funds.20 Indeed, allocation of EU 
expenditure has become one of the most delicate issues in intergovernmental 
negotiations, even if the EU budget is equal to only 1.1-1.2% of its total GNP, 
because “winners” and “losers” can be easily identified on the basis of the 
difference between benefits received from EU budget and contributions paid to 
it (Laffan and Shackleton 2000).  
We may test this hypothesis directly, by replacing the variable GDP_RATIO 
in Equation (27) with a new variable BALANCE, defined as a country’s benefits 
from minus contributions to the EU budget, expressed as a percentage of GNP. 
In this case, we should expect a positive sign for the BALANCE coefficient, 
since poorer countries are generally net beneficiaries. The results shown in 
Table 4 fully corroborate our hypothesis.  
                                                 
19 Time fixed effects cannot be used with AR terms because of multicollinearity problems. 
20 For a detailed presentation and discussion on the Structural Funds, see, for instance, Allen (2000). 
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With regard to the EU-8 equation for the 1978-2003 period (Tables 5 and 
6)21, we may first notice that both the OLS and the FGLS specifications yield 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar results;22 the main difference is just the 
value of the UNEMPL coefficient, which is quite larger (in absolute value) in the 
former than in the latter. Second, our model performs well in the long run too, 
with some interesting differences in comparison with the previous EU-14 case. 
Economic conditions are still important, but now inflation is the most significant 
of these variables, whereas GDP growth and public debt exert no effect on 
support for the EU. Unemployment remains significant at 5% level. These 
findings are similar to those of Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) for the 1973-
1993 period, where inflation and unemployment were significant, but economic 
growth was not. By contrast, Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) found that only 
inflation was significant, but they used a slightly different definition of the 
dependent variable23 and, as mentioned above, their analysis focused on a 
shorter period (1973-1988).   
It is not surprising that inflation plays a relevant role in shaping mass support 
for the EU over the extended time period, because economic policy in the late 
1970s and the 1980s exhibited a strong anti-inflationary stance all over Western 
Europe, and also at the EC level through the creation of the EMS. Hence we 
may argue that citizens seemed to share the concern of their governments 
about price stability after the stagflation phenomenon in the 1970s. 
Another difference compared with the EU-14 results is the insignificance of 
EXPEND and ENTRY (both when employed one at a time and together), which 
suggests that heterogeneity of preferences becomes relevant only when a 
larger number of countries is included in the analysis. That is to say, 
subsequent enlargement rounds (especially the 1995 one) have made the EU 
more diverse and only in the last few years such increased heterogeneity has 
affected support for EU membership. The coefficient of GDP_RATIO is still 
negative and significant, which implies that, ceteris paribus, support for the EU 
is higher in poorer member countries.   
                                                 
21 The DEFICIT variable is not included in these regressions because data for some countries were not 
available for the whole period. 
22 As shown in Table 4, an F-test rejected the presence of country fixed effects when the model is 
estimated with OLS. However, the results obtained with fixed effects are reported for comparison. 
23 Instead of absolute support for EU membership, they employed net support (percentage of citizens in 
favour of membership minus percentage of citizens against it). 
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 Finally, in order to test the robustness of our results, we also estimated the 
model for the EU-14 with different measures of economic performance. More 
precisely, we employed indicators of “relative” (instead of “absolute”) economic 
performance, constructed by substituting the values of GROWTH, UNEMPL, 
INFL, DEFICIT and DEBT with the difference between them and the EU 
average. Such new variables are termed R_GROWTH, R_UNEMPL, R_INFL, 
R_DEFICIT and R_DEBT respectively (Tables 7 and 8). We found no dramatic 
differences with the standard model. The relative debt level becomes 
insignificant, but relative growth and unemployment always remain significant at 
5% level at least (sometimes at 1% level) and relative inflation and deficit are as 
insignificant as were their absolute values. The most important variables of our 
model, namely GDP_RATIO, BALANCE, EXPEND and ENTRY, remain highly 
significant, whether associated with indicators of relative or absolute macro-
economic performance.  
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Table 3. Determinants of public opinion support for EU membership in the EU-
14: regression results, 1995-2003 
 
Dependent Variable: MEMB 
Method: Pooled OLS-AR(1) with Panel Corrected Standard Errors and Covariances 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
CONSTANT 
 
11.188 
(2.901)** 
19.446 
(3.123)** 
6.348 
(1.481)** 
10.699 
(4.946)* 
GROWTH 
 
0.634 
(0.289)* 
0.624 
(0.284)* 
0.625 
(0.293)* 
0.737 
(0.324)* 
UNEMPL 
 
-1.796 
(0.365)** 
-1.669 
(0.391)** 
-1.435 
(0.288)** 
-1.630 
(0.523)** 
INFL 
 
-0.217 
(0.298) 
-0.184 
(0.308) 
-0.203 
(0.270) 
-0.241 
(0.282) 
DEBT 
 
-0.165 
(0.041)** 
-0.173 
(0.077)* 
-0.187 
(0.038)** 
-0.107 
(0.031)** 
DEFICIT 
 
-0.155 
(0.306) 
-0.034 
(0.381) 
-0.266 
(0.312) 
-0.220 
(0.542) 
GDP_RATIO 
 
-0.211 
(0.045)** 
-0.239 
(0.054)** 
-0.256 
(0.050)** 
-0.332 
(0.093)** 
EXPEND 
 
0.489 
(0.123)** 
1.048 
(0.367)**  
0.412 
(0.113)** 
ENTRY 
 
10.392 
(1.247)**  
9.775 
(1.165)**  
Fixed Effects No No No Country 
F-test for country 
fixed effects - - - 1.799* 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.901 0.899 0.899 0.919 
σ 0.812 0.806 0.822 0.798 
N observations 224 224 224 224 
F-statistic 88.820 86.354 91.955 63.705 
* significant at 5% level 
**significant at 1% level 
 
Source: author's calculations 
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Table 4. Determinants of public opinion support for EU membership in the EU-
14: regression results, 1995-2003 
 
Dependent Variable: MEMB 
Method: Pooled OLS-AR(1) with Panel Corrected Standard Errors and Covariances 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
CONSTANT 
 
9.808 
(1.978)** 
14.380 
(3.577)** 
4.645 
(0.835)** 
11.175 
(4.648)** 
GROWTH 
 
0.519 
(0.253)* 
0.535 
(0.255)* 
0.534 
(0.257)* 
0.582 
(0.273)* 
UNEMPL 
 
-1.717 
(0.355)** 
-1.708 
(0.379)** 
-1.258 
(0.271)** 
-1.695 
(0.518)** 
INFL 
 
-0.132 
(0.304) 
-0.089 
(0.309) 
-0.044 
(0.302) 
-0.125 
(0.293) 
DEBT 
 
-0.293 
(0.041)** 
-0.101 
(0.043)* 
-0.314 
(0.038)** 
0.169 
(0.076)* 
DEFICIT 
 
-0.202 
(0.260) 
-0.204 
(0.404) 
-0.054 
(0.276) 
-0.110 
(0.344) 
BALANCE 
 
5.687 
(1.223)** 
4.339 
(0.790)** 
4.808 
(1.045)** 
6.082 
(1.585)** 
EXPEND 
 
0.537 
(0.204)** 
0.919 
(0.419)*  
0.640 
(0.226)** 
ENTRY 
 
12.939 
(0.999)**  
11.892 
(0.900)**  
Fixed Effects No No No Country 
F-test for country 
fixed effects - - - 2.422** 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.905 0.893 0.903 0.907 
σ 0.872 0.856 0.843 0.813 
N observations 224 224 224 224 
F-statistic 93.638 85.869 95.932 65.239 
* significant at 5% level 
**significant at 1% level 
Source: author's calculations 
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Table 5.  Determinants of public opinion support for EU membership in the EU-
8: regression results, 1978-2003 
 
Dependent Variable: MEMB 
Method: Pooled OLS-AR(1) with Panel Corrected Standard Errors and Covariances 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
CONSTANT 
 
3.572 
(2.798) 
5.433 
(3.247) 
2.789 
(1.789) 
7.236 
(3.157)* 
GROWTH 
 
0.064 
(0.199) 
0.066 
(0.201) 
0.062 
(0.200) 
0.104 
(0.206) 
UNEMPL 
 
-1.051 
(0.449)* 
-1.100 
(0.487)* 
-1.055 
(0.471)* 
-0.734 
(0.282)** 
INFL 
 
-0.620 
(0.194)** 
-0.607 
(0.198)** 
-0.613 
(0.201)** 
-0.587 
(0.189)** 
DEBT 
 
-0.071 
(0.049) 
-0.070 
(0.056) 
-0.069 
(0.050) 
-0.107 
(0.212) 
GDP_RATIO 
 
-0.0643 
(0.021)** 
-0.099 
(0.027)** 
-0.098 
(0.028)** 
-0.095 
(0.258)** 
EXPEND 
 
0.120 
(0.254)  
0.086 
(0.258) 
0.084 
(0.259) 
ENTRY 
  
5.500 
(5.069) 
5.663 
(5.121)  
Fixed Effects No No No Country 
F-test for country 
fixed effects - - - 1.122 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.899 0.899 0.899 0.902 
σ 0.778 0.796 0.781 0.752 
N observations 400 400 400 400 
F-statistic 239.072 255.161 256.747 175.210 
* significant at 5% level 
** significant at 1% level 
 
Source: author's calculations 
 
 60
Table 6.  Determinants of public opinion support for EU membership in the EU-
8: regression results, 1978-2003 
 
Dependent Variable: MEMB 
Method: FGLS-AR(1) 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
CONSTANT 
 
1.454 
(1.929) 
4.231 
(3.209) 
1.874 
(1.313) 
5.934 
(2.546)* 
GROWTH 
 
0.088 
(0.104) 
0.068 
(0.132) 
0.090 
(0.131) 
0.037 
(0.122) 
UNEMPL 
 
-0.449 
(0.186)* 
-0.506 
(0.220)* 
-0.433 
(0.184)* 
-0.342 
(0.141)* 
INFL 
 
-0.559 
(0.161)** 
-0.556 
(0.174)** 
-0.558 
(0.173)** 
-0.530 
(0.156)** 
DEBT 
 
-0.032 
(0.033) 
-0.023 
(0.041) 
-0.032 
(0.039) 
-0.083 
(0.065) 
GDP_RATIO 
 
-0.101 
(0.032)** 
-0.162 
(0.046)** 
-0.161 
(0.046)** 
-0.096 
(0.031)** 
EXPEND 
 
0.049 
(0.166) 
0.100 
(0.179)  
0.065 
(0.145) 
ENTRY 
 
6.096 
(7.156)  
6.167 
(7.264)  
Fixed Effects No No No Country 
F-test for country 
fixed effects - - - 2.315* 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.927 0.926 0.926 0.965 
σ 0.822 0.857 0.865 0.833 
N observations 400 400 400 400 
F-statistic 1169.618 1252.968 1249.245 934.814 
* significant at 5% level 
**significant at 1% level 
 
Source: author's calculations 
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Table 7. Determinants of public opinion support for EU membership in the EU-
14: regression results, 1995-2003 
 
Dependent Variable: MEMBERSHIP 
Method: Pooled OLS-AR(1) with Panel Corrected Standard Errors and Covariances 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
CONSTANT 
 
6.484 
(2.463)** 
16.597 
(3.493)** 
5.655 
(1.634)** 
10.594 
(3.915)** 
R_GROWTH 
 
0.616 
(0.284)* 
0.647 
(0.269)* 
0.608 
(0.283)* 
0.500 
(0.185)** 
R_UNEMPL 
 
-0.496 
(0.154)** 
-0.693 
(0.197)** 
-0.411 
(0.143)** 
-0.365 
(0.173)* 
R_INFL 
 
-0.098 
(0.227) 
-0.036 
(0.349) 
-0.102 
(0.223) 
-0.102 
(0.231) 
R_DEBT 
 
-0.022 
(0.037) 
-0.074 
(0.069) 
-0.017 
(0.034) 
-0.060 
(0.144) 
R_DEFICIT 
 
-0.142 
(0.330) 
-0.004 
(0.034) 
-0.128 
(0.324) 
-0.167 
(0.317) 
GDP_RATIO 
 
0.187 
(0.025)** 
0.127 
(0.029)** 
0.184 
(0.024)** 
0.248 
(0.037)** 
EXPEND 
 
-0.866 
(0.241)** 
-1.043 
(0.362)**  
-0.646 
(0.204)** 
ENTRY 
 
3.652 
(0.560)**  
3.634 
(0.583)**  
Fixed Effects No No No Country 
F-test for country 
fixed effects - - - 2.645** 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.895 0.890 0.893 0.907 
σ 0.718 0.749 0.785 0.702 
N observations 224 224 224 224 
F-statistic 88.164 86.630 92.456 64.563 
* significant at 5% level 
**significant at 1% level 
 
Source: author's calculations 
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Table 8. Determinants of public opinion support for EU membership in the EU-
14: regression results, 1995-2003 
 
Dependent Variable: MEMBERSHIP 
Method: Pooled OLS-AR(1) with Panel Corrected Standard Errors and Covariances 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
CONSTANT 
 
19.438 
(2.690)** 
18.065 
(2.821)** 
28.590 
(2.075)** 
12.511 
(3.789)** 
R_GROWTH 
 
0.580 
(0.279)* 
0.725 
(0.248)** 
0.585 
(0.277)* 
0.599 
(0.206)** 
R_UNEMPL 
 
-0.412 
(0.187)* 
-1.039 
(0.364)** 
-0.495 
(0.217)* 
-0.394 
(0.178)* 
R_INFL 
 
-0.104 
(0.248) 
-0.040 
(0.288) 
-0.099 
(0.245) 
0.086 
(0.228) 
R_DEBT 
 
-0.037 
(0.050) 
-0.070 
(0.075) 
-0.031 
(0.048) 
-0.085 
(0.078) 
R_DEFICIT 
 
-0.004 
(0.332) 
-0.140 
(0.370) 
-0.016 
(0.237) 
-0.087 
(0.218) 
BALANCE 
 
2.220 
(0.621)** 
3.449 
(0.738)** 
2.457 
(0.724)** 
2.314 
(0.703)** 
EXPEND 
 
-0.916 
(0.259)** 
-1.330 
(0.307)**  
-0.707 
(0.196)** 
ENTRY 
 
8.165 
(1.987)**  
9.161 
(1.729)**  
Fixed Effects No No No Country 
F-test for country 
fixed effects - - - 2.840** 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.894 0.890 0.892 0.906 
σ 0.793 0.845 0.810 0.781 
N observations 224 224 224 224 
F-statistic 87.078 87.091 91.667 68.557 
* significant at 5% level 
**significant at 1% level 
 
Source: author's calculations 
 
 
 
 63
 
5. Citizens’ response to economic performance: what implications for the 
European Constitution and the enlargement process? 
 
We can draw some policy implications from our analysis. Firstly, the timing 
of national referenda on EU issues affects their chance of success. Ceteris 
paribus, if a country holds a referendum when its economic growth is sluggish 
and its unemployment is high, it will be more likely to see a majority of citizens 
voting against further integration. This is consistent with the experience of the 
recent referenda in France and the Netherlands, where citizens have rejected 
the European Constitution: according to the latest Eurostat figures, the 
unemployment rate in France reached 9.8% in April 2005 and quarterly real 
GDP growth in the Netherlands was –0.1% in the first quarter of 200524. 
Unfortunately, national policymakers have little freedom for choice in this 
respect, because EU treaties usually indicate a date for their entry into force 
and referenda can only be held during a period starting after the signature of the 
treaty and ending before the envisaged date of entry into force. For instance, 
the European Constitution should have been ratified by 1 November 2006, two 
years after its signature; the first referendum took place in February 2005 in 
Spain, while the last ones were originally scheduled in the UK or the Czech 
Republic in late spring 2006. In such a short time span, economic conditions are 
not very likely to change dramatically. The only really effective tool at 
government’s disposal is choosing parliamentary ratification instead, provided 
that a referendum is not compulsory according to national constitutional rules, 
because, as Moravcsik (1994) argued with regard to the near rejection of the 
Maastricht Treaty in France, ‘referenda on international issues are likely to be 
risky’ (p.59). 
 Secondly, it appears quite clear that, in order to boost public support, the 
EU should concentrate its activity on policies promoting economic growth and 
fighting unemployment. However, the picture is complicated by the fact that 
many elements of economic policy still remain of national competence, even if 
member states have to coordinate their economic policies and each year the 
                                                 
24 The Netherlands also pays the largest net contribution to the EU budget in percentage of GNP (0.43% 
in 2003), corresponding to roughly 120€ per capita. 
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Council of Ministers adopts a recommendation setting out broad economic 
policy guidelines for the member states.25 At present, EU countries are 
engaged in the so-called Lisbon Strategy, launched at the Lisbon European 
Council in 2000, aiming at making the EU ‘the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic 
growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ (European 
Council 2000).  
So far the outcome has been disappointing and in 2005 the European 
Commission has proposed a revision of the Lisbon Strategy, giving a higher 
priority to growth and employment (European Commission 2005). However, its 
implementation still depends on how seriously national governments take their 
commitments. EU institutions should then focus their activity on areas where 
they can really exert a strong impact, namely the single market. Indeed, 
according to the words of the European Constitution, the Union has ‘exclusive 
competence’ on ‘the establishing of the competitions rules necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market’ (Art. I-13), while the internal market as a 
whole is an area of ‘shared competence’ (Art. I-14), which means that ‘the 
Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has 
not exercised, or has decided to cease exercising, its competence’ (Art. I-12).   
The most topical issue in the internal market area is the liberalisation of 
trade in services, which account for roughly 70% of jobs in the EU. A real single 
market for services has not been established yet, because numerous sectors 
still hide, de facto, behind national barriers. In 2004 the Commission proposed a 
directive (usually referred to as ‘services directive’) precisely aiming at 
abolishing those barriers. According to an  independent study, the liberalisation 
of services could create up to 600,000 new jobs and add €33 billion a year to 
EU GDP (Copenhagen Economics 2005), giving a relevant contribution to the 
relaunch of the Lisbon Strategy. However, in March 2005 the European Council 
did not endorse the proposed directive and invited the Commission to redraft it, 
by stating that: 
 
                                                 
25 See European Commission (2002) for details on the procedures for coordination of economic policies 
in the EU. 
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‘In order to promote growth and employment and to strengthen 
competitiveness, the internal market of services has to be fully operational 
while preserving the European social model. [...][The] ongoing debate [...] 
shows that the directive as it is currently drafted does not fully meet these 
requirements’ (European Council 2005, p.7). 
 
Indeed, the strongest opposition to the services directive came from France 
(followed by Germany), that feared a risk of “social dumping”, in which 
competition from poorer EU countries would drive down French welfare 
standards and could trigger a wave of job losses for French nationals (Gros 
2005). The most interesting feature of the story is that rejection of the services 
directive was linked to the referendum on the European Constitution that France 
was going to hold in May 2005: preservation of the “European social model”, 
allegedly threatened by the proposed liberalisation in the services sector, was 
perceived by the French government as one of the elements able to persuade 
the French people to vote in favour of the Constitution (Franck 2005)26. 
Therefore, a policy measure which could boost economic growth and 
employment over the next few years and consequently increase public support 
for the EU in the long run, has faced opposition because in the short run it is 
deemed to be very unpopular and may worsen the image of the EU in people’s 
eyes. At present, the text passed by the European Parliament at first reading in 
February 2006 was significantly watered down (Gros 2006). 
In terms of government popularity, the trade-off between long-term benefits 
and short-term costs of economic reforms is well known at the national level, 
but this paper suggests that a similar trade-off is relevant also at the EU level, in 
terms of support for the integration process. The main difference is that in the 
former case citizens may vote against the government at the following election, 
while in the latter they can only express their discontent by voting against 
further integration when (and if) a referendum on EU issues is held in their 
country. 
                                                 
26 An opinion poll conducted by TNS-Sofres on the referendum day in France actually found that the 
most frequently mentioned reason for voting “No” was precisely that ‘the Treaty will worsen 
unemployment in France’ (see http://www.tns-sofres.com). 
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Finally, looking at the future of public opinion support for the EU, we may 
use our model to make some tentative predictions about the impact of the 2004 
enlargement, which brought in eight central and eastern European countries 
(CEECs), plus Cyprus and Malta. According to our analysis, on the one hand 
heterogeneity of preferences should increase, since public expenditure in the 
new member states is generally much lower than the EU average27; this would 
negatively affect the level of mass support for EU membership. On the other, 
the new members are much poorer than the EU average (thus they should be 
large net beneficiaries from the EU budget) and are enjoying much higher GDP 
growth rates. According to Eurostat figures, in 2004 per capita GDP among the 
CEECs ranged from 81% of EU average in Slovenia to 47% in Latvia, while 
growth in 2004 varied from 8% in Latvia to 4% in Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovenia and in 2005 it ranged from 10% in Latvia to 3% in Poland. These two 
features should boost support for the EU in the CEECs.28 The net effect could 
therefore be ambiguous and only in the next few years one could determine 
whether it is positive or negative.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we firstly proposed a model of citizens’ support for membership 
of international unions, with explicit reference to the EU. The core of the model 
is the existence of a trade-off between the advantages of centralising the 
provision of public goods and the heterogeneity in preferences among 
countries. Subsequently we tested the model on a panel of EU countries. The 
findings were consistent with our theoretical expectations: the conditions of the 
national economy, differences in income among member states and 
heterogeneity of preferences shape citizens’ attitude towards their country’s 
membership of the EU. Consequently, this analysis offers some interesting 
policy implications for the present debate about ratification of the European 
Constitution and, more generally, about how the EU could act in order to gain 
                                                 
27 According to Eurostat, in 2004 the average public expenditure in the ten new member states was 42.7% 
of GDP whereas the EU-25 average equalled 47.7%. 
28 The accession of the CEECs might also have a negative effect on support for the EU in some “old” 
member countries like Italy and, to a lesser extent, Spain and Ireland, which are going to receive a lower 
amount of Structural Funds as from 2007. 
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more support from the European public. The broad conclusion which we can 
draw is that the reaction of the Europeans to the advance of the integration 
process does not seem to be a priori either positive or negative. It may well 
depend on the impact of integration on the economic performance of their 
country.  
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Annex 1. Evolution of public opinion support for EU membership in member states
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Annex 2. Correlation matrices of variables 
 
Table A.1. Correlation matrix of variables for EU-14 models 
 MEMB GROWTH UNEMPL INFL DEBT DEFICIT GDP_RATIO BALANCE EXPEND ENTRY R_GROWTH R_UNEMPL R_INFL R_DEBT R_DEFICIT 
MEMB  1.000               
GROWTH  0.255  1.000              
UNEMPL  -0.220  0.065  1.000             
INFL  -0.073  0.001 -0.085  1.000            
DEBT  -0.227 -0.073  0.140  0.046  1.000           
DEFICIT -0.028  0.084 -0.353 
-
0.228 -0.443  1.000          
GDP_RATIO -0.244 -0.103 -0.253 
-
0.317 -0.259  0.156  1.000         
BALANCE  0.428  0.312  0.226  0.320  0.171 -0.228 -0.723  1.000        
EXPEND  -0.369 -0.322 -0.001 
-
0.021  0.263 -0.216 -0.134 -0.186  1.000       
ENTRY -0.492 -0.129  0.185  0.081  0.333 -0.309 -0.215 -0.006  0.268  1.000      
R_GROWTH  0.343  0.848  0.101  0.082 -0.073  0.011 -0.143  0.338 -0.318 -0.156  1.000     
R_UNEMPL  -0.339  0.058  0.936 
-
0.069  0.278 -0.187 -0.362  0.213  0.024  0.181  0.091  1.000    
R_INFL  -0.083  0.037 -0.130  0.937  0.024 -0.091 -0.330  0.332 -0.017  0.087  0.064 -0.094  1.000   
R_DEBT  -0.146 -0.085  0.291  0.057  0.989 -0.380 -0.257  0.158  0.287  0.342 -0.086  0.276  0.044  1.000  
R_DEFICIT -0.042  0.052 -0.243 
-
0.172 -0.346  0.819  0.144 -0.232 -0.301 -0.286  0.069 -0.194 -0.169 -0.431  1.000 
Source: author's calculations 
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Table A.2. Correlation matrix of variables for EU-8 models 
 MEMB GROWTH UNEMPL INFL DEBT GDP_RATIO EXPEND ENTRY 
MEMB  1.000        
GROWTH  0.014  1.000       
UNEMPL -0.159  0.054  1.000      
INFL -0.170 -0.126 -0.094  1.000     
DEBT  0.232 -0.025  0.176 -0.166  1.000    
GDP_RATIO -0.379 -0.031 -0.206 -0.348 -0.251  1.000   
EXPEND 0.102 -0.214  0.098  0.010  0.152  0.006  1.000  
ENTRY  0.052 -0.103 -0.129 -0.141  0.161  0.155  0.308  1.000 
Source: author's calculations 
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CHAPTER 3: BETWEEN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND 
REGIONAL AUTONOMY: THE CASE OF ITALY FROM AN 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Over the last few decades, a double tendency has characterised some 
European States: the transfer of certain powers to a supranational entity like the 
European Union (EU), on the one side, and a move towards regional autonomy, 
on the other. Italy represents a very interesting case in this respect, because, 
besides being one of the founding members of the EU, it implemented a 
process of decentralisation during the 1970s, further strengthened by a 
constitutional reform in 2001. 
Moreover, the issue of the allocation of competences among the EU, the 
Member States and the regions is now especially topical. The process leading 
to the drafting of European Constitution (even if then it has not come into force) 
has attracted much attention from a constitutional political economy perspective 
both on a normative and positive point of view (Tabellini 2003a,b, Alesina and 
Perotti 2004, Breuss and Eller 2004, Mueller 2005). In 2005 the Italian 
parliament passed a new thorough constitutional reform, which included, among 
other things, the so called “devolution”, i.e. granting the regions exclusive 
competence in public health care, education and local police; however, such 
reform was rejected by citizens in a referendum in June 2006 and thus will not 
come into force. 
The goal of this paper is empirical. Following and extending the 
methodology proposed in a recent influential article by Alesina et al.(2005b), 
which only concentrated on the EU activity (treaties, legislation, and European 
Court of Justice’s rulings), we develop a set of quantitative indicators measuring 
the intensity of the legislative activity of the Italian State, the EU and the Italian 
regions29 from 1973 to 2005 in a large number of policy categories. By doing so, 
                                                 
29 Throughout the paper, we will define the sub-national level in Italy as the regions, since more local 
levels of government (provinces and municipalities) have no legislative power. 
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we seek to answer the following broad questions. Are European and regional 
legislations substitutes for state laws? To what extent are the competences 
attributed by the European treaties or the Italian Constitution actually exerted in 
the various policy areas? Is their exertion consistent with the normative 
recommendations from the economic literature about their optimum allocation 
among different levels of government? The main results show that, first, there 
seems to be a certain substitutability between EU and national legislations 
(even if not a very strong one), but not between regional and national ones. 
Second, the EU concentrates its legislative activity mainly in international trade 
and agriculture, whilst social policy is where the regions and the State (which is 
also the main actor in foreign policy) are more active. Third, at least two levels 
of government (in some cases all of them) are significantly involved in the 
legislative activity in many sectors, even where the rationale for that is, at best, 
very questionable, indicating that they actually share a larger number of policy 
tasks than that suggested by the economic theory. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the framework 
for our analysis, drawing on the normative recommendations for the optimum 
degree of centralisation or decentralisation of competences suggested by the 
economic literature on integration and disintegration processes and fiscal 
federalism. Section 3 describes the rules governing the actual allocation of 
policy tasks among the EU, the Italian State and the Italian regions. Section 4 
introduces the empirical analysis by discussing the relation between national 
legislation, on the one side, and European and regional ones, on the other. 
Section 5 presents our indicators measuring various aspects of the involvement 
of the three level of governments in different policy sectors. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
 
2. A simple framework: "who should do what?" 
 
The recent economic literature on integration and disintegration processes 
provides a useful framework for a discussion about the optimum allocation of 
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policy competences among different levels of governments30. Alesina et al. 
(2001, 2005a) analyse the determinants of the degree of centralisation and the 
size of international unions by modelling a union as a group of countries 
deciding together on the provision of public goods or policies which produce a 
spillover effect across members. Bolton and Roland (1997) employ 
heterogeneity in economic fundamentals (income or productivity) and 
distortionary taxation to study the conditions under which a majority in favour of 
secession (or unification) arises in the regions of a democratic country. 
These papers focus on a basic trade-off between the benefits of 
centralisation, arising from economies of scale or externalities, and the costs of 
harmonising policies as a consequence of the heterogeneity of preferences, 
which suggest decentralisation of policy tasks. The normative conclusions imply 
that competence in areas with large economies of scale and relevant 
externalities to be internalised should be attributed to a supranational level of 
government, whilst sectors whose dominant feature is heterogeneity of 
preferences should be of national or local competence. These ideas are also 
related to theories of fiscal federalism, pioneered by Tiebout (1956), Musgrave 
(1959) and Oates (1972).31 Fiscal federalism, however, is especially relevant 
when discussing about allocation of competences between national and sub-
national levels of government (thus leaving aside the supranational level), 
because it emphasises the roles of individual mobility and fiscal transfers, which 
are both much larger inside a single country than in an international union like 
the EU. 
The application of the theoretical principles outlined above to the real world 
first requires a classification of policy areas. Throughout the paper we will follow 
that proposed by Alesina et al. (2005b), which presents the advantages of being 
quite simple and broadly consistent with existing data sources, and identify the 
following nine policy categories (some of them are further split into sub-
categories in order to obtain more homogeneous policy sectors): 
International trade: it includes external trade provisions; 
                                                 
30 See Ruta (2005) for a detailed survey of this strand of literature. 
31 An excellent survey of fiscal federalism can be found in Oates (1999). 
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Common Market: this area encompasses all the provisions aimed at promoting 
the free movement of goods, services, capital and people inside the EU, and at 
harmonising or establishing mutual acceptance of national norms; 
Money and Fiscal: this broad chapter covering economic policy is divided into 
two sub-categories. Money and macro policy concerns monetary and 
macroeconomic policy, including budgets. Taxation refers to provisions 
concerning direct and indirect taxation; 
Education, research and culture: this category encompasses a wide range of 
policies, including also youth policies, tourism and sport;   
Environment: it includes protection of the environment and measures against 
pollution;  
Sectoral business relations: this broad area is further split into three sub-
categories: Agriculture and fisheries, Industry and energy, Transport; 
Non-sectoral business relations: it includes competition policy, undertaking laws 
and state aid; 
International relations: this chapter encompasses foreign policy (except for 
commercial policy), defence and foreign aid;  
Citizen and social protection: this area covers a wide range of policies and 
therefore is divided into three sub-categories: Justice and migration (including 
home affairs, civil rights and fight against crime) Health, employment and social 
protection (including consumer protection), Regional aid. 
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Table 1. Allocation of competences: normative recommendations from the 
economic literature  
 
 EU level National level Sub-national level
International trade X   
Common Market X   
Money and fiscal    
Money and macro policy X X x 
taxation  X X 
Education, research, 
culture 
x X X 
Environment X X X 
Sectoral business 
relations 
   
agriculture and fisheries  X  
industry and energy  X  
transport x X X 
Non-sectoral business 
relations 
X   
International relations X X  
Citizen and social 
Protection 
   
justice and migration x X X 
health, employment and 
social protection 
 X X 
regional aid  X  
X = large role; x = small or supporting role; 
Source: adapted from Breuss and Eller (2004) and Alesina et al. (2005b) 
 
The normative insights about the allocation of competences among different 
levels of government from the economic literature are summarised in Table 1, 
with the caveat that inevitably judgements on such issue are quite tentative and 
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include a certain degree of subjectivity. For a more detailed discussion see 
Alesina et al. (2005b) and the extensive survey by Breuss and Eller (2004). 
Firstly, there exists a group of competencies which should be attributed to 
only one level of government. Among them, the areas of International trade and 
Common Market should quite clearly be assigned to the EU; consequently the 
EU should have exclusive competence in Non-sectoral business relations too, 
since the maintenance of different national regulations about competition policy 
or state aid could distort the functioning of the Single Market. On the contrary, 
Agriculture and fisheries, Industry and energy, Regional aid should be assigned 
to the national level, because they do not provide public goods on an 
international scale (the first two policy sectors) or because of large 
heterogeneity of preferences (the last sector). 
Secondly, some competences should be shared among different levels of 
government. Environment, Transport and Justice and migration may reasonably 
involve the EU, the Member States and the regions, because they present 
some effects of scale or some kind of externalities calling for EU-wide action 
(for instance, problems of global warming, international transportation and 
communication network, international crime), but have also a clear national or 
local dimension (think of preservation of environmental heritage, national or 
local transportation network, local crime). International relations  shows 
significant economies of scale and externalities to be exploited at the EU level 
(especially in the defence sector), but also preference heterogeneity because of 
different national geo-political interests; therefore both the EU and the Member 
States should probably have competence on such policy area. 
Finally, in a certain number of policy sectors the optimal allocation of 
competences is quite controversial and hotly debated in the literature. This is 
the case for Money and fiscal, Education, research and culture and Health, 
employment and social protection. The first has been the subject of a long 
debate concentrating on the benefits and costs of centralisation of monetary 
policy at the EU level in the light of the theory of Optimum Currency Area 
(Mundell 1961, De Grauwe 2003) and of coordination of national fiscal policies 
(Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1998, Brunila et al. 2001); another issue in this field 
concerns the assignment of taxing powers to the different levels of government 
according to the principles of fiscal federalism. The second policy area presents 
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heterogeneous national or local preferences and limited externalities as regards 
educational and cultural matters, but it has been pointed out that there exists 
economies of scale in research and development which might call for a 
supranational intervention (Hoeller et al. 1996). The last category is 
characterised by large differences in the level of protection offered by national 
welfare systems, which have led many authors to identify different 'European 
social models' (Sapir 2005). Heterogeneous preferences also provide a strong 
argument in favour of decentralisation at the sub-national level; however, a role 
for the EU has sometimes been advocated with a view to avoiding the risk of 
social dumping, which could produce a negative externality between Member 
States (Persson et al. 1997). 
In order to provide a rough guide for our subsequent empirical analysis, we 
may argue that Money and macro policy should be shared between the EU and 
the Member States (with an obvious role for the sub-national governments in 
defining their own budgetary policy), whereas Taxation and Health, employment 
and social protection and Education, research and culture between the national 
and the sub-national levels. As regards the latter area, however, economies of 
scale in research activities suggest at least a supporting role for the EU in that 
field.  
 
 
3. The actual allocation of competences 
 
This section gives a concise presentation, only providing the essential 
background for our empirical analysis, of the actual allocation of competences 
between the EU and the Member States and between the State and the regions 
in Italy (for more details on the former, see Hix 2005, Nugent 2002; on the latter, 
see Rescigno 2005). 
The evolution of the EU’s policy responsibilities is shown in Table 2. It can 
be easily noted a pattern characterised by more and more competences 
assigned to the EU in an ever larger number of policy sectors, which have 
added to the Community’s original tasks (concerning international trade, 
common market and agriculture). Such transfer of competence has taken place 
over the last twenty years through the Single European Act (1987), the 
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Maastricht Treaty (1993), the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) and, to a lesser extent, 
the Nice Treaty (2003).32 
According to the European Constitution33 and the working documents of the 
European Convention which drafted it (European Convention 2002a,b), three 
categories of EU competence can be identified: exclusive, shared and 
complementary. The first confers the EU the exclusive right to legislate in a 
specific area; the Member States can only act to implement EU law. This 
category includes: customs union, competition rules for the internal market, 
monetary policy for the Euro area, common commercial policy and conservation 
of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy. The second 
applies to areas in which 'the Member States shall exercise their competence to 
the extent that the Union has not exercised [...] its competence’ (Art. I-12). In 
other words, once the EU has adopted a legislative act, Member States may no 
longer legislate in the field covered by it and EU laws prevail over those of the 
Member States. Most policy areas fall into this category, including, among 
others, agriculture and fisheries, internal market and environment. The third is 
defined as the 'competence to carry out supporting, coordinating or 
complementary action' (Art. I-17); the EU's activity cannot supersede Member 
States' competence nor entail harmonisation of their laws. Areas falling into this 
category are, for instance, industry, education and culture. 
The EU's activity has to conform to the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. According to the former, the EU should not act unless its action 
is more effective than that taken at national, regional or local level. is intended 
to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen and that 
constant checks are made as to whether any proposed action at the EU level is 
actually justified by reason of its scale or effects; however, subsidiarity does not 
apply to the areas falling into the EU’s exclusive competence. The latter states 
that any action by the EU should not go beyond what is essential to achieve the 
objectives envisaged in the Treaties. Nevertheless, since they are rather 
general, these principles are often difficult to translate into practice (Begg 1993; 
Berglof et al. 2003). 
                                                 
32 The years in parentheses refer to the entry into force of the treaties. 
33 Even if it has not entered into force, the European Constitution provides a very useful classification of 
the present system of EU competence. 
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The primary source of EU law is represented by the Treaties, which also 
identify the main legal instruments available to the EU institutions (secondary 
law). Here the classic division is between binding acts (regulations, directives 
and decisions) and non-binding acts (recommendations and opinions). As 
regards binding acts, both regulations and directives are of general scope, and 
are by their nature normative. The former are addressed directly to citizens and 
are binding in their entirety, whereas the latter are addressed to Member States 
and are binding with regard to the objective, but leave Member States the 
freedom to choose the appropriate legal instrument to achieve it. By contrast, a 
decision 'constitutes an individual act which is not of general scope' (European 
Convention 2002b, p.5): it is usually addressed to specific individuals, firms or 
countries and is binding in its entirety.  
The 1948 Italian Constitution provided for the formation of regions as 
autonomous entities with own powers and functions, but they were actually 
created only in 1970 and started to function in April 1972 after a series of 
decrees had operated a first (and quite restrictive) transfer of competences, 
which was then widened and completed in 1977 by legislative decree 616/77 
(Putnam 1993). There are two categories of regions: most of them (15 out of 
20) are classified as "ordinary", while the other five are called "special", as they 
are granted a slightly larger degree of autonomy because of their peculiar 
geographical and cultural characteristics.34  
The ordinary regions were given legislative power in policy areas falling into 
their competence, but all their laws had to respect the ‘fundamental principles’ 
established by state law and could not go against the ‘national interest’ or the 
interests of other regions. Therefore the regions had no exclusive competence 
in any matters; their legislative power always had to be shared with the State. In 
2001, a constitutional reform changed such system.35 Now the Constitution 
provides a list of matters in which the State retains exclusive legislative 
competence, has enlarged the number of areas of shared competence (called 
‘matters of concurrent legislation’) and attributes exclusive competence to the 
                                                 
34 This category is composed of three small regions located at the northern borders of the country, with a 
large presence of ethnic and linguistic minorities (Valle d'Aosta, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Trentino-Alto 
Adige) plus the two largest Italian islands (Sardinia and Sicily). 
35 This reform became fully operative in May 2003 after the passing by parliament of the so called “La 
Loggia Act” (see Bordignon and Cerniglia 2004 for more details).  
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regions in all other matters. A detailed comparison between State and regional 
competences before and after 2001 is provided in Annex 1. 
Table 2. Evolution of the EU's policy responsibilities (1970-2005) 
  1970 1987 1993 2005 
1  International trade  4 4 4 4 
2 Common Market     
2a  harmonization of legislation 4 4 4 4 
2b four freedoms 3 3 3 3 
3  Money and fiscal      
3a Money and macro policy policy      
 money 1 2 3 4 
 macroeconomic policy 1 1 2 2 
3b Taxation      
 direct 1 1 1 1 
 indirect & common market  1 3 3 3 
4 Education, research, culture     
4a  education and research  1 2 2 2 
4b culture 1 1 2 2 
5  Environment  1 3 3 3 
6  Sectoral business relations      
6a Agriculture and fishery  3 3 3 3 
6b Industry   1 2 2 2 
 Energy 1 1 3 3 
6c Transport  1 3 3 3 
7  Non-sectoral business relations 
(competition/subsidies/company 
law)  
3 3 3 3 
8  International relations      
8a foreign policy 1 2 3 3 
 defence 1 1 2 2 
 foreign aid 2 2 2 2 
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9  Citizen and social protection      
9a Justice and migration 1 1 2 3 
9b Health, employment and social 
protection 
    
 consumer protection 1 1 3 3 
 health  1 1 2 2 
 employment 1 1 1 2 
 social protection 2 3 3 3 
9c Regional aid 1 3 3 3 
1=States' exclusive competence 2=Complementary competence 3=Shared competence 4=EU's 
exclusive competence 
Source: adapted from European Convention (2002a) and EC/EU Treaties. 
 
Here we highlight the discrepancies between the actual allocation of 
competences among the EU, the Italian State and the Italian regions and the 
normative recommendations outlined above in Table 1. Table 3 shows that the 
policy responsibilities of the State are broadly in line with the theoretical 
prescriptions, except for Non-sectoral business relations, where its role does 
not seem justified. The EU has an excessively large role in Sectoral business 
relations and Citizen and social protection, even if this does not sound very 
surprising if some politico-economic reasons are taken into account. For 
instance, as regards Agriculture and fisheries, the Common Agricultural Policy 
was the first genuine European policy, put in place when the European 
Community was a net importer of food products and a large share of its 
workforce was still employed in agriculture, in order to guarantee food self-
sufficiency and a fair income to farmers (Tracy 1992). Another prominent 
example is Regional aid,  where the role of the EU has found a political 
justification as a provider of side payments for those Member States supposed 
to be penalised from the completion of the Single Market and the creation of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (Allen 2000). With regard to the Italian regions, 
they can play a large role in Money and macro policy (especially as regards 
banking and coordination of public finance) and have  also been granted (quite 
surprisingly) some responsibilities for International trade and International 
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relations, where, according to the economic theory, they should have no 
competence at all.  
In all, each level of government seems to have an excessive number of 
competences and can thus act also in areas where its involvement is, at best, 
very questionable. However, what has been discussed so far is only the 
situation “on paper”, according to the European Treaties and the Italian 
Constitution. In section 5 below, we will investigate to what extent such 
competences are actually exercised. 
To conclude our discussion, we may now look at what the people think 
about the allocation of competences between the various levels of government. 
To evaluate the actual preferences of the Italians, we may look at data from 
Eurobarometer, a public opinion survey conducted, twice a year, face-to-face 
with a representative sample of individuals in each member State. An identical 
set of questions is asked 1000 people in each member State. In autumn 2003, 
EU citizens were asked whether policy decisions in a certain number of areas 
should be taken jointly by the EU and the national governments (shared 
competence) or by the national governments only. In interpreting these data, 
however, two caveats are in order. First, the exact meaning of “Shared” is 
unclear; different interpretations by respondents in different countries cannot be 
ruled out. Second, the responses to certain questions (for example: regional 
aid) could be biased in certain countries by the presumption that transferring 
policy responsibility to the EU may result in net benefits for those countries. 
Having said that, we may notice two interesting facts (Table 4).  
 89
Table 3. Actual allocation of competences  
 EU STATE REGIONS 
International trade X x x 
Common Market X x  
Money and fiscal    
Money and macro policy X X X 
taxation x X X 
Education, research, 
culture 
x X X 
Environment X X X 
Sectoral business 
relations 
   
agriculture and fisheries X X* X* 
industry and energy X X** X** 
transport X X X 
Non-sectoral business 
relations 
X X x 
International relations X X x 
Citizen and social 
protection 
   
justice and migration X X X 
health, employment and 
social protection 
X X X 
regional aid X X  
X = large role; x = small or supporting role. Characters in bold indicate 
discrepancy with the desired allocation of competences as defined in Table YY. 
* In Italy, before the 2001 constitutional reform, competence in Agriculture and fisheries was 
shared between the State and the regions; afterwards, the regions have been granted exclusive 
competence in such area, with the important exception of food.   
** In Italy, before the 2001 constitutional reform, the State had exclusive competence in Industry 
and energy, with the notable exception of handicrafts; afterwards, the regions have been 
attributed exclusive competence in Industry (including handicrafts), while Energy has become 
an area of shared competence. 
Source: EC/EU Treaties and Italian Constitution 
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Table 4. Desired allocation of competences according to Italian and EU-15 
citizens 
   ITALY EU15 (1)-(2)
Policy category   EU  (1) National  EU  (2) National  
9a  Terrorism   87 8 84 13 +3 
9a  Exploit. hum. beings   82 13 79 17 +3 
8a  Foreign policy   81 11 72 20 +9 
8c  Humanitarian aid   79 17 69 26 +10 
4  Research   76 18 66 28 +10 
3  Currency   75 20 63 32 +12 
9a  Political asylum   73 20 53 41 +20 
9a  Immigration   73 23 51 45 +22 
9a  Organised crime   71 25 71 25 0 
9a  Accepting refugees   70 24 53 43 +17 
9a  Drugs   70 25 68 29 +2 
9b  Poverty/ social exclusion 66 30 57 39 +9 
9b  Ageing   63 23 48 42 +15 
5  Environment   62 33 62 34 0 
8b  Defence   62 34 50 45 +12 
4  Cultural policy   58 33 42 51 +16 
9b  Unemployment   58 38 44 53 +14 
9c  Regional aid   54 40 58 36 -4 
9a  Juvenile crime   49 45 38 58 +11 
6  Agric. & Fishing   45 44 50 43 -5 
9a  Justice   46 50 32 65 +14 
4  Education   45 50 32 64 +13 
9b  Health & Social Welfare  42 54 29 67 +13 
9a  Urban crime   37 57 33 63 +4 
9a  Police   38 58 27 70 +11 
Question: 'For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the 
[NATIONALITY] government, or made jointly within the European Union?' "EU" = percentage of 
people preferring joint decision-making. "National" = percentage of people preferring national 
decision-making only. The percentage of "do not know" is not reported. 
Source: European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 60.1 and own 
calculations 
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Table 5. Opinion poll on devolution (July 2004) 
Statements % of people 
agreeing 
"The State should transfer most of its competences (for 
instance, education, public health care and police) to the 
Regions, and grant them a high degree of financial 
autonomy"  
24 
"The State should grant more autonomy to the Regions, 
especially with regard to education, public health care and 
police, while retaining however a role in controlling and 
coordinating them" 
42 
"The State should retain its competences in the areas of 
education, public health care and police" 
34 
N of persons interviewed  
Source: Corriere della Sera (2004) 
 
Firstly, the Italian citizens prefer joint decision-making in 20 areas out of 25; 
only with regard to Justice, Education, Health and social welfare, Urban crime 
and Police a majority of people think they should be of exclusive national 
competence. Secondly, the Italians are much more "europhile" than the average 
of the European citizens. As shown in the last column of Table 4, the difference 
between the former and the latter is especially large in sectors related to Justice 
and migration, Health, employment and social policy and Education, Research 
and Culture (only in the areas of Agriculture and fishing and Regional Aid are 
the Italians less in favour of joint decision-making than the European average)   
Unfortunately, similar surveys with regard to the allocation of competences 
between the State and the regions do not exist in Italy. However, in a recent 
opinion poll a sample of citizens were asked to express their view about the 
proposed "devolution" of powers in the fields of education, public health care 
and police from the State to the regions (Table 5). A relative majority of citizens 
seem to prefer a model of shared competence (42%), while the percentage of 
people against any transfer of competences to the State from the regions is 
higher than that of people saying that such competences should exclusively 
belong to the regions (34% against 24%).  
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It is finally interesting to look at the degree of fiscal autonomy of the 
supranational and the sub-national levels of government and at where their 
expenditure goes. As regards the EU, in contrast to the regulatory role, its direct 
fiscal role has grown only slowly and has remained very limited. EU expenditure 
as a share of GDP and relative to national public spending has increased 
somewhat, but minimally in respect to the legislative activity. It also remains 
very low in absolute terms, i.e. if one compares with the size of government 
spending in any existing example of federal government. Indeed, EU 
expenditure only rose from 0.4% of GDP in 1975 to 1.1% in 2004 (European 
Court of Auditors 2005). In 2004, appropriations for commitments the Common 
Agricultural Policy (40.5%), followed by regional policy (36,8%), other internal 
policies (8.8%) and administration (5.7%). 
With regard to the Italian regions, their expenditure has risen from 4% of 
Italian GDP in 1975 to 10% in 2004. In the second half of the 1990s, they 
enjoyed a strong growth in their financial autonomy, especially with the 
introduction of a new regional business tax (IRAP) in 1998; indeed, their ratio of 
current tax revenue to total current revenue has sharply increased from 8.5% to 
44.2% in 2000 (Table 6). According to the Italian Treasury Ministry, as regards 
appropriations for commitments in 2003 (the last year for which a sectoral 
breakdown is available) the lion's share goes to health care (54,5%), followed 
by transport (5.4%), administration (5.0%) and education and vocational training 
(3.3%). 
 
Table  6. Basic data on regional public finances 
 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Total Expenditure/National GDP 4.2% 8.7% 9.1% 9.9% 8.8% 8.9% 10.1% 
Current Transfer/Current revenue 90.6% 94.6% 96.2% 95.8% 90.9% 53.8% 54.3% 
Current Tax Revenue/Current revenue 3.6% 1.5% 0.8% 1.6% 8.5% 44.2% 44.2% 
Source: own calculations based on data from Italian Treasury Ministry (various 
years) 
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4. The evolution of legislative activity  
 
This section provides a general overview of the evolution of the legislative 
activity carried out by the Italian State, the EU and the Italian regions, before 
moving to a sectoral analysis in the next section. First, we have to define what 
kinds of acts are to be included in our definition of “laws”. In order to make 
meaningful comparisons, for each level of government only the following 
categories of acts are taken into account:  
- Italy: ordinary laws passed by the Italian parliament (henceforth, the State); 
- EU: regulations and directives (decisions are excluded because they are not of 
general scope); 
- Regions: regional laws passed by both ordinary and special regions.  
All legislative acts passed by each level of government from 1973 (when the 
ordinary regions started to operate) to 2005 are counted, regardless of whether 
they are still into force or not. The split into three sub-periods in Table 7 shows 
that the number of state laws remained almost stable from 1973 to the mid-
1990s, then sensibly declined over the last decade. The opposite is true for the 
EU: just a slight increase in 1984-94 from the number registered in 1973-83, 
then a dramatic rise over the last decade. The pattern followed by regional laws 
is quite similar to that of state laws, even if their declining trend is smoother. If 
one looks at the ratio of EU to state laws and to that of regional to state laws, 
the former has been marked by a spectacular increase in the last sub-period 
(from 7.7 to 17.4), whilst the latter has not varied very significantly throughout 
the 1973-2005 period.  
 
Table 7. Number of laws passed by the State, the EU and the regions 
 1973-83 1984-94 1995-2005 Total (1973-2005) 
State       2246 2218 1660 6124 
EU          15436 16974 28915 61325 
Regions  13646 11735 9261 34642 
EU/State 6.9 7.7 17.4 10.0 
Regions/Italy 6.1 5.3 5.6 5.7 
Source: see Annex 2 
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The number of state laws is negatively correlated (-0.41) with that of EU 
laws and positively correlated (0.40) with that of regional laws (Table 8). 
Therefore there appears to be a certain degree of substitutability between EU 
laws and state laws, while regional laws and state laws tend to be 
complementary. The latter phenomenon may seem surprising at first sight, but 
can be accounted for if we consider the different characteristics and timing of 
the transfer of competences from the State to the supranational and sub-
national levels respectively. In the former case, a certain number of policy areas 
are of exclusive competence of the EU and even when they are shared with 
Member States, EU legislation prevails over national ones; moreover, the 
transfer has been progressive but almost continuous during the last two 
decades, mainly through the 1987 Single European Act, the 1993 Maastricht 
Treaty and the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty. Hence EU and state laws may be 
substitutes. 
 
Table 8. Correlation matrix of variables 
 
 LAW_ITA LAW_EU LAW_REG EARLY_EL REGULAR_EL EL 
LAW_ITA  1      
LAW_EU -0.410  1     
LAW_REG  0.396 -0.516  1    
EARLY_EL -0.433 -0.186  0.209  1   
REGULAR_EL -0.121  0.129 -0.259 -0.119  1  
EL -0.457 -0.095  0.043  -  -  1 
Source: own calculations 
 
In the latter case, on the contrary, over most of the period considered the 
ordinary regions had no exclusive competences and in areas of shared 
competence regional laws were submitted to the 'fundamental principles' 
established by state laws; moreover, the process of transfer of competences 
was concentrated in a short time span (from 1972 to 1977), then no further 
increase in regional powers took place until the 2001 constitutional reform, 
which, however, is too recent to produce notable effects. These features thus 
explain why regional laws actually add to state ones, not substitute for them. 
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May these statistical correlations imply a causal relationship between the 
annual number of EU and regional laws, on the one side, and the annual 
number of state laws, on the other? In other words, is the latter really influenced 
by the former? From the above discussion, we may suppose that the growing 
legislative activity of the EU does have played a role in reducing that of the 
State, whereas we should not expect any significant effect of the number of 
regional laws on that of state laws. 
Obviously, before testing econometrically these hypotheses, it must be 
noted that the number of state laws passed in a certain year should be 
influenced also by other factors; in particular, it should be lower in years where 
parliamentary elections take place, which impose a few-month stop to the 
legislative activity. According to the Constitution, the two chambers of 
parliament are elected for five years, but, throughout the 1973-2005 period, 
early elections have been very frequent (they took place in 1976, 1979, 1983, 
1987, 1994 and 1996), whilst regular elections (at the end of a complete five-
year term) were only held in 1992 and 2001. One may suppose that the 
negative impact of early elections on the number of laws is larger than that of 
regular elections, because in the former case, which usually takes place after a 
government crisis, the dissolution of parliament is not anticipated by the 
institutional actors, while in the latter they expect the dissolution of parliament 
and can adapt their behaviour accordingly (for instance, by intensifying their 
legislative production in the months prior to the dissolution). To test whether the 
number of EU laws and that of regional laws significantly affect the number of 
state laws after controlling for election years, we estimate the following two 
equations:36 
 
LAW_ITAt = α + β1LAW_EUt + β2LAW_REGt + β3ELt + εt                                                  (1) 
LAW_ITAt = α + β1LAW_EUt + β2LAW_REGt + β3EARLY_ELt + β4REGULAR_ELt+ 
+εt                                                                                                                                                                                                                             (2) 
t = 1973,...,2005 
 
                                                 
36 We also tried to include other political variables in the equations, namely the existence of a centre-left 
or centre-right majority in parliament and the use of proportional or majority electoral rules. However 
they not only prove insignificant, but also suffered from serious problems of multicollinearity with the 
other explanatory variables. 
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where 
LAW_ITAt is the number of ordinary laws passed by the State in year t; 
LAW_EUt is the number of regulations and directives adopted by the EU in year 
t; 
LAW_REGt is the number of regional laws passed by the Italian regions in year 
t; 
ELt takes a value of 1 if parliamentary elections took place in Italy year t, 0 
otherwise; 
EARLY_ELt takes a value of 1 if early parliamentary elections took place in Italy 
in year t, 0 otherwise; 
REGULAR_ELt takes a value of 1 if regular parliamentary elections took place 
in Italy in year t, 0 otherwise; 
εt is the normally-distributed error term. 
The two specifications explain respectively about 40 and 45 per cent of the 
variance of the dependent variable (Table 9). The Ljung-Box Q-statistic shows 
no sign of autocorrelation of the residuals; this is not surprising, since the 
variables in the model do not have an economic nature. The coefficient of 
LAW_EU is negative and always highly significant, while that of LAW_REG is 
positive but not significant. However, their quantitative impact is fairly low. An 
increase of 100 in the annual number of EU laws implies a decrease of almost 3 
in the annual number of state laws. The hypotheses on elections are fully 
corroborated by the data. According to specification (1), in an election year the 
Italian parliament approves on average 55 laws less than in a normal year, but 
equation (2) shows that this negative effect is much larger for early elections 
than for regular ones (-70 against -12) and is only significant in the former case. 
Moreover, we performed a Chow test in order to check for a possible 
breakpoint in our data in 1994, when the change from proportional to 
(prevalently) majoritarian electoral rules took place, but no structural change 
between the two subperiods (1973-1993 and 1994-2005) was detected, as 
reported in the last line of Table 9.  
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Table 9. Estimation results  
Dependent Variable: LAW_ITA 
Method: OLS with White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors 
 Equation (1) Equation (2) 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
C 
191.760 
(53.056)* 
176.414 
(52.162)* 
LAW_EU 
-0.026 
(0.009)* 
-0.027 
(0.009)* 
LAW_REG 
0.053 
(0.037) 
0.070 
(0.037) 
EL 
-54.774 
(16.477)*  
EARLY_EL  
-69.616 
(18.618)* 
REGULAR_EL  
-12.190 
(10.203) 
   
Adjusted R-squared 0.407 0.456 
N observations 33 33 
F-statistic 8.321 7.702 
Ljung-Box Q-statistics (χ²(5)) 2.660 3.997 
Chow Breakpoint Test for 1994 
(F-statistic) 1.382 1.547 
* significant at 1% level 
Summary statistics are reported in Annex 2.  
Source: own calculations 
 
With the caveats that the number of available observations is necessarily 
quite limited, what conclusions can be drawn from these regressions? The 
progressive transfer of competences to and the consequent growing legislative 
activity of the EU actually seem to have contributed, albeit not to a very large 
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extent, to the diminution of the legislative activity of the State. By contrast, the 
regions have played no role in it. As discussed above, from the late 1970s to 
the beginning of this century their policy competences did not change and all of 
them were shared with the State; their legislative production has followed a 
pattern similar to that of the State, but, as expected, the statistical effect of the 
former on the latter is not significant. 
 
 
5. Sectoral breakdown of legislation 
 
We now proceed to analyse the sectoral distribution of all the legislative acts 
passed in the 1973-2005 period by the  State, the EU and a sample of ordinary 
regions composed of the five most populous ones (Region-5): Lombardy, 
Campania, Lazio, Veneto and Piedmont, together accounting for 50% of the 
Italian population (29.5 million people out of 58.5 million).37 Laws are classified 
according to the policy categories defined in Section 2 above. For details on 
data sources, see Annex 2. 
Our exercise is purely quantitative and presents the advantage of being 
objective and transparent. However, laws may be more or less influential. For 
instance, the Italian parliament has traditionally made frequent use of the so 
called leggine ("small laws"), targeted at satisfying very narrow and specific, 
often local, interests (Spotts and Wieser 1986). The approach followed in this 
paper does not permit to assess the quality of legislation, but, if one assumes 
that differences in the relevance and effectiveness of legislative acts are 
randomly distributed across policy areas, this problem becomes much less 
severe, since we use very large samples and thus can reasonably rely upon the 
law of large numbers (Alesina et al. 2005b). 
Tables 10 and 11 provide an overview of the legislative activity of the State, 
the EU, and the Region-5 in the various sectors. A further category, termed 
Institutional provisions, is added for practical reasons, namely to ensure that all 
legislative acts can be classified. This is not a real policy sector, but a residual 
category covering all those norms concerning the internal functioning and 
                                                 
37 The correlation coefficient between the annual number of laws passed by the Region-5 and those 
passed by all the 20 regions in the 1973-2005 period is 0.90. 
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organisation of the institutions (including elections and referenda), which could 
not enter the other policy areas.  
The bulk of State's activity is in Citizen and social protection (27.6%), 
International relations (17.8%), Sectoral business relations (17.3%), Money and 
fiscal (12.0%) and Education, research and culture (11.7%). The fall in the 
number laws passed in 1995-2005 mainly came from Citizen and social 
protection (especially Health, employment and social protection), Sectoral 
business relations and Money and fiscal, while International relations registered 
a considerable increase.  
It is important to note that these findings about the State's legislative activity 
are not affected by the need to transpose EU directives into national legislation, 
since only a negligible number of ordinary laws transposing EU directives were 
passed: 21 in 1973-1983, 24 in 1984-94 and 8 in 1995-2005. Indeed in Italy EU 
directives are usually transposed by instruments other than ordinary laws. Since 
1989, most directives are implemented in the following way: parliament passes 
an ordinary law, known as legge comunitaria (“Community Act”), delegating the 
government to adopt the necessary measures by means of legislative decrees 
or other instruments (Rescigno 2005): for instance, 309 legislative decrees 
transposing EU directives were issued in the 1995-2005 period. A legislative 
decree is an act with legal force issued by the government after receiving a 
delegation by parliament, which issues an ordinary law identifying the subject 
covered by such delegation and specifying  principles and criteria of guidance to 
be followed by the government. The government may issue more than one 
legislative decree for each delegation. Legislative decrees are not included in 
our analysis because, until 1988, they were simply termed "decrees", making it 
very difficult to distinguish between decrees with legal force and other kinds of 
government decrees. 
With regard to the EU, almost 90% of its legislation is concentrated in just 
two areas: Agriculture and fisheries (54.7%)38 and International trade (33.5%). It 
is interesting to note the increase in International relations in 1984-94, mainly 
due to the development of tools such as association or cooperation agreements 
                                                 
38 As pointed out by Alesina and Spolaore (2003, p.240), such an impressive figure also reflects the high 
degree of specificity and detail of EU legislation in this sector.   
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and financial assistance to third countries39, and in Citizen and social protection 
(notably in Health, employment and social protection) and Money and macro 
policy in 1995-2005, as a result of the new competences in social and economic 
policy attributed to the EU by the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. The 
Region-5 are active, above all, in Citizen and social protection (25.7%), Sectoral 
business relations (18.4%), Money and macro policy (17.4%)40 and Education, 
research and culture (15.6%). The number of laws experienced a decline in all 
categories in 1995-2005, but it was particularly sharp in Health, employment 
and social protection.  
The basic data presented so far can only give a partial and quite fragmented 
picture of the involvement of the State, the EU and the Region-5 in the various 
policy domains. In particular, they do not yet enable us to effectively compare 
the activity of the three levels of government in a specific sector, because the 
size of their legislative production is very different (6124 laws for the State, 
61325 for the EU, 8944 for the Region-5). To do so, we construct a few 
summary indicators whose values depend on the relative weights of the nine 
policy categories41 for each level of government, but not on the absolute 
number of legislative acts. Such indicators permit us to extend our analysis and 
answer the following questions: in what categories is the activity of each level of 
government more intense, both in absolute terms and in comparison with the 
other levels? What are the most heavily regulated sectors? In which areas are 
competences actually more shared between different levels of government or 
more exclusively exercised by a single level?  
We proceed in two steps. First, following the methodology proposed by 
Alesina et al. (2005b), we create a new indicator for each of the three level of 
governments, termed ITA, EU and REG respectively, by dividing the number of 
laws in each of the nine policy categories in Table 10 by the column mean 
(reported in the last row of Table 10) and then normalising such new values so 
that the column mean in Table 12 equals 1 (columns 1, 2 and 3).42 Hence a 
                                                 
39 Relations with Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 probably represent the most prominent example. 
40 This surprisingly high figure is chiefly due to budget laws and their frequent amendments during the 
financial year and to laws approving the budget of various regional administrative bodies. 
41 Institutional provisions is excluded from the following analysis because it is a category not 
corresponding to a real policy sector.  
42 Sub-categories' values are normalised so that their mean equals the value of the indicator for their own 
category. 
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value above (below) 1 indicates large (small) legislative activity of the 
corresponding level of government in a certain area. We term this feature 
"absolute involvement" (Table 13).  
Afterwards, we construct three more indicators (Table 12, columns 4, 5 and 
8): arithmetic mean (A), geometric mean (G) and minimum value (M), defined 
as follows: 
 
 A= (ITA+EU+REG)/3                (3) 
 
3 **= REGEUITAG                                                     (4) 
 
M = min (ITA; EU; REG)               (5) 
 
We also calculate M and G with respect to ITA and EU only, and ITA and 
REG only (Table 12, columns 6, 7, 9, 10). The values of A, M, and G are 
normalised so that their column mean in Table 12 equals 1.43 The three 
indicators serve different purposes. A performs two functions: first, it provides a 
measure of how heavily "regulated" a policy sector is, irrespective of which 
levels of government actually legislate in it (the column labelled TOTAL in Table 
13); second, by comparing its value to those of ITA, EU and REG, we may 
evaluate the "relative involvement" of each level of government in a certain 
category, i.e. whether its legislative activity is more or less intense than that 
category's average (Table 14).44 By contrast, both G and M measure the 
intensity of the joint legislative activity of all the levels of government 
considered;45 the former indicator gives equal weight to the values of ITA, EU 
and REG, whereas the latter only takes into account the smallest among them. 
We use their arithmetic mean to assess whether legislative competence is 
shared among the three levels of government (or between two of them) or 
exclusively exerted by a single level of government (Table 15). 
                                                 
43 As before, sub-categories' values are normalised so that their mean equals the value of the indicator for 
their own category. 
44 A level of government may show, at the same time, a low absolute involvement and a high relative 
involvement (or vice versa) in a certain sector; this is the case, for instance, of the EU in the Common 
market category (see below). 
45 Both indicators score 0 in a certain category if at least one level of government is not involved in 
legislative activity. 
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The main findings for each policy sector can be summarised as follows: 
International trade: this category offers the clearest example of EU’s exclusive 
competence; the EU’s involvement is very high (both in absolute and relative 
terms), but, since the role of the State is negligible and that of the regions is nil, 
this policy sector presents, as a whole, a medium degree of regulation. 
Common market: it shows many similarities to International trade (almost 
exclusive EU’s competence, limited role of the State, no role for the regions), 
but the EU’s absolute involvement is very low and thus the degree of regulation 
is very low too.  
Money and fiscal: in both Money and macro policy and Taxation, the EU’s 
absolute and relative involvement are very low; Money and macro policy is 
shared between the State and the regions and is a highly regulated sector, with 
a higher involvement of the regions; Taxation is of almost exclusive State’s 
competence and presents a low degree of regulation. 
Education, research and culture: the competence in this category is mainly 
shared between the State and the Regions, with a higher involvement of the 
latter; the EU plays a very small role and the overall degree of regulation is 
medium. 
Environment: this is a lowly regulated sector, where the main role is played by 
the regions, which display a medium absolute involvement, while the presence 
of the State and the EU is much lower.  
Sectoral business relations: competences in all three subcategories are highly 
shared among the three levels of government; Agriculture and fisheries is the 
only policy area where the absolute involvement of the EU, the State and the 
regions is high or very high and therefore it is very highly regulated; in relative 
terms, the EU's involvement is however much higher than that of the other two 
levels; both Industry and energy and Transport show a high absolute 
involvement of the State and the regions and a low one of the EU; the former 
sector is characterised by a medium degree of regulation, the latter by a high 
one. 
Non-sectoral business relations: this category is mainly of State’s competence, 
with some role played also by the regions, whereas the EU’s involvement is 
very low; however, the overall degree of regulation is very low. 
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International relations: the competence in this area is partially shared between 
the State and the EU, with high absolute and relative involvements of the former 
and small ones of the latter; the role of the regions is negligible and the overall 
degree of regulation is low. 
Citizen and social protection: the situations of the three subcategories are 
rather different, even if the EU's involvement in all of them is low or very low; 
Justice and migration is a highly regulated sector, shared between the State 
and the regions, which are both highly involved in it; Health, employment and 
social protection is highly shared among the three levels of government and 
very highly regulated, with a high involvement of the State and the regions; 
finally, Regional aid presents a low degree of regulation and is mainly of State's 
competence. 
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Table 10. Sectoral breakdown of legislative acts passed by the three levels of government (1973-2005)  
 Number of laws   % of total   
 ITALY EU REGION-5 ITALY EU REGION-5 
International trade 15 20522 0 0.2% 33.5% 0.0% 
Common Market 81 1247 0 1.3% 2.0% 0.0% 
Money and fiscal 734 437 1697 12.0% 0.7% 19.0% 
Money and macro policy 352 295 1558 5.7% 0.5% 17.4% 
Taxation 382 142 139 6.2% 0.2% 1.6% 
Education, research, culture 714 107 1399 11.7% 0.2% 15.6% 
Environment 200 507 1044 3.3% 0.8% 11.7% 
Sectoral business relations 1061 34677 1642 17.3% 56.5% 18.4% 
Agriculture and fisheries 336 33554 656 5.5% 54.7% 7.3% 
Industry and energy 287 562 418 4.7% 0.9% 4.7% 
Transport 438 561 568 7.2% 0.9% 6.4% 
Non-sectoral business relations 228 298 264 3.7% 0.5% 3.0% 
International relations 1093 1839 40 17.8% 3.0% 0.4% 
Citizen and social protection 1693 1291 2302 27.6% 2.1% 25.7% 
Justice and migration 588 157 546 9.6% 0.3% 6.1% 
Health, employment and social protection 823 930 1756 13.4% 1.5% 19.6% 
Regional aid 282 204 0 4.6% 0.3% 0.0% 
Institutional provisions 304 399 556 5.0% 0.7% 6.2% 
TOTAL 6124 61325 8944 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
       
Mean* 646.6 6769.4 932.0    
*Excluding Institutional provisions 
Source: see Annex 2 
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Table 11. Sectoral and temporal breakdown of legislative activity (1973-2005) 
 Italy   EU   Region-5   
 1973-83 1984-94 1995-2005 1973-83 1984-94 1995-2005 1973-83 1984-94 1995-2005
International trade 5 9 1 7878 5739 6905 0 0 0 
Common Market 26 47 8 336 477 435 0 0 0 
Money and fiscal 290 281 163 111 0 326 598 617 482 
Money and macro policy 99 161 92 71 45 179 554 564 440 
Taxation 191 120 71 40 52 50 44 53 42 
Education, research, culture 222 270 222 13 22 72 583 504 312 
Environment 63 72 65 67 177 263 381 410 253 
Sectoral business relations 477 374 210 7784 11567 15326 813 521 308 
Agriculture and fisheries 161 117 58 7381 11331 14842 352 205 99 
Industry and energy 123 104 60 306 73 184 172 146 100 
Transport 193 153 92 98 163 300 289 170 109 
Non-sectoral business 
relations 
86 86 56 25 72 202 79 98 87 
International relations 294 341 458 118 845 876 2 24 14 
Citizen and social protection 684 607 402 139 254 898 1006 861 435 
Justice and migration 199 214 175 0 15 142 202 205 139 
Health, employment and social 
protection 
363 288 172 108 189 633 804 656 296 
Regional aid 122 105 55 31 50 123 0 0 0 
Institutional provisions 99 130 75 63 97 239 201 195 160 
TOTAL 2246 2218 1660 16557 19347 25421 3663 3230 2051 
Source: see Annex 2 
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Table 12. Main summary indicators of legislative activity (1973-2005)  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
     G G G M M M 
 ITA EU REG A TOTAL ITA-EU ITA-REG TOTAL ITA-EU ITA-REG
International trade 0.02 3.01 0.00 1.05 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 
Common Market 0.12 0.18 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.00 
Money and fiscal 1.08 0.06 1.71 0.99 0.91 0.45 1.59 0.29 0.24 1.46 
Money and macro policy 1.03 0.09 3.14 1.48 1.33 0.52 2.42 0.39 0.33 2.30 
Taxation 1.12 0.04 0.28 0.50 0.48 0.38 0.75 0.19 0.16 0.62 
Education, research, culture 1.05 0.02 1.41 0.86 0.53 0.22 1.42 0.07 0.06 1.42 
Environment 0.29 0.07 1.05 0.49 0.52 0.25 0.65 0.34 0.28 0.40 
Sectoral business relations 1.56 5.09 1.65 2.88 4.35 4.84 1.87 7.06 5.95 2.12 
Agriculture and fisheries 1.48 14.77 1.98 6.33 8.85 11.46 2.01 15.88 13.39 2.11 
Industry and energy 1.27 0.25 1.26 0.96 1.85 1.37 1.48 2.66 2.24 1.80 
Transport 1.93 0.25 1.71 1.35 2.36 1.69 2.13 2.65 2.23 2.44 
Non-sectoral business relations 0.34 0.04 0.27 0.22 0.29 0.21 0.35 0.20 0.17 0.36 
International relations 1.61 0.27 0.04 0.67 0.48 1.13 0.30 0.18 1.03 0.05 
Citizen and social protection 2.49 0.19 2.32 1.73 1.90 1.18 2.80 0.86 0.72 3.14 
Justice and migration 2.59 0.07 1.65 1.50 1.43 0.76 2.69 0.37 0.26 2.95 
Health, employment and social protection 3.63 0.41 5.30 3.24 4.27 2.18 5.72 2.20 1.56 6.48 
Regional aid 1.24 0.09 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.00 
Source: own calculations 
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Table 13. The "absolute involvement" of the three level of governments in 
legislative activity* 
 EU STATE REGIONS TOTAL 
International 
trade 
very high very low nil medium 
Common Market very low very low nil very low 
Money and 
fiscal 
    
Money and macro 
policy 
very low medium very high high 
Taxation very low medium low low 
Education, 
research, 
culture 
very low medium high medium 
Environment very low low medium low 
Sectoral 
business 
relations 
    
Agriculture and 
fisheries 
very high high high very high 
Industry and 
energy 
low high high medium 
Transport low high high high 
Non-sectoral 
business 
relations 
very low low low very low 
International 
relations 
low high very low low 
Citizen and 
social protection
    
Justice and 
migration 
very low very high high high 
Health, 
employment and 
social protection 
low very high very high very high 
Regional aid very low medium nil low 
*TOTAL is given by the arithmetic mean of ITA, EU and REG. The degree of "absolute 
involvement" is calculated as follows. Let "xi" (i=ITA, EU, REG, TOTAL) be the value of indicator 
i in each policy sector. If xi<0.25 then "very low"; if 0.25≤xi<0.75 then "low"; if 0.75≤xi<1.25 then 
"medium"; if 1.25≤xi<2.5 then "high"; if xi≥2.5 then "very high" 
Source: own calculations 
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Table 14. The "relative involvement" of the three level of governments in 
legislative activity* 
 EU STATE REGIONS 
International 
trade 
very high very low nil 
Common Market high medium nil 
Money and fiscal    
Money and macro 
policy 
very low low high 
Taxation very low high low 
Education, 
research, culture 
very low medium high 
Environment very low low high 
Sectoral 
business 
relations 
   
Agriculture and 
fisheries 
high very low low 
Industry and 
energy 
low high high 
Transport very low high high 
Non-sectoral 
business 
relations 
very low high medium 
International 
relations 
low high very low 
Citizen and 
social protection 
   
Justice and 
migration 
very low high medium 
Health, 
employment and 
social protection 
very low medium high 
Regional aid very low very high nil 
*The degree of "relative involvement" is calculated as follows. Let "xi" (i=ITA, EU, REG) be the 
value of indicator i in each policy sector. If xi<0.25*A then "very low"; if 0.25*A≤xi<0.75*A then 
"low"; if 0.75*A≤xi<1.25*A then "medium"; if 1.25*A≤xi<2.5*A then "high"; if xi≥2.5*A then "very 
high" 
Source: own calculations 
 
 
 
 109
 
 
Table 15. The degree of "competence sharing" between different levels of 
government*  
 EU + STATE + 
REGIONS 
EU + STATE STATE + 
REGIONS 
International trade nil low nil 
Common Market nil low nil 
Money and fiscal    
Money and macro 
policy 
medium low high 
Taxation low low low 
Education, research, 
culture 
low very low high 
Environment low low low 
Sectoral business 
relations 
   
Agriculture and 
fisheries 
very high very high high 
Industry and energy high high high 
Transport very high high high 
Non-sectoral 
business relations 
very low very low low 
International 
relations 
low medium very low 
Citizen and social 
protection 
   
Justice and migration medium low very high 
Health, employment 
and social protection 
very high high very high 
Regional aid nil low nil 
*The degree of "competence sharing" is calculated as follows. Let GM = (G+M)/2 be the value 
of the mean of G and A in each policy sector. If GM<0.25 then "very low"; if 0.25≤GM<0.75 then 
"low"; if 0.75≤GM<1.25 then "medium"; if 1.25≤ GM <2.5 then "high"; if GM≥2.5 then "very high"  
Source: own calculations 
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The overall picture emerging from our analysis suggests two main remarks. 
Firstly, whereas the situation in some areas (such as International trade or 
Education, research and culture) is in line with the previous normative 
recommendations, in too many policy sectors competences appear to be really 
shared among the three levels of government, contrary to what the economic 
theory would suggest. This is especially true for Agriculture and fisheries, 
Industry and energy and Health, employment and social protection. The first 
area is particularly interesting, not much because of the very large role of the 
EU, which is well documented in the literature, but just because, despite it, also 
the State and the regions intervene heavily. The lack of clarity stemming from 
the joint involvement of different levels of government in too many areas may 
make it difficult for citizens to understand "who actually does what".46  
Secondly, in spite of an extensive transfer of competence to the EU and to 
the regions, the legislative role of the State in Italy is still crucial in most sectors. 
This is broadly consistent with an intergovernmentalist view of the European 
integration process (Moravcsik 1998, Milward 2000) and contrast with the vision 
of a "Europe of the Regions" predicted by some observers a few years ago (for 
instance, Drèze 1993), where increasing international economic integration 
would possibly lead to domestic political disintegration. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This article has analysed the legislative production of the EU, the Italian 
parliament and the Italian regions in various policy sectors over the last three 
decades, in order to evaluate the effects of two phenomena occurred in Italy 
almost at the same time: the progressive transfer of powers to a supranational 
entity like the EU and the move to regional autonomy. The main findings have 
shown that European and national legislations (but not regional and national 
legislations) are, to a certain extent, substitutes and that an excessive number 
of competences are actually shared among different levels of government. 
                                                 
46 A notable exception to such pattern is Environment, the area in which the involvement of all three 
levels of government would probably be most justified according to the economic theory, where, by 
contrast, the role of the regions is clearly predominant.  
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From an economic perspective, it may well be recommended that some 
competences be shared, but only when the balance between scale or spillover 
effects and heterogeneity of preferences suggests so. When, on the contrary, 
too many levels of government are involved in a certain policy area, the 
distinction between their different responsibilities easily becomes unnecessarily 
blurred. This may not only leads to a slower and inefficient policy-making 
process, but also risks to make it too complicate to understand for citizens, who, 
on the contrary, should be able to know who is really responsible for a certain 
policy when they vote in national, local or European elections or in referenda on 
national or European constitutional issues. 
This latter remark raises relevant issues of accountability in modern 
democracies. An unclear allocation of competences, on the one side, makes 
politically convenient for the central government to criticise the EU  for 
unpopular domestic decisions (the “blame Brussels” strategy, in press jargon); 
on the other, if a regional government is run by a different coalition of parties 
than that supporting the central government, it provides a strong incentive for 
the former to blame the latter (or vice-versa) in case of some local political 
problems or policy failures. However, such strategies can become very costly, 
because, when they are called to express their opinion, citizens may even block 
the political processes promoting European integration or regional autonomy 
through their vote.47 In the last few years, the issue of the optimum allocation of 
competences is therefore likely to become not only of increasing academic 
interest, but also more and more pressing for policy-makers.  
Finally, the findings of this article offer some suggestions for further work. 
First, national legislation, even when it is not explicitly transposing EU 
directives, may however be influenced or constrained by the EU (for instance, 
via Court of Justice's rulings). A quantitative analysis like that performed in this 
paper could actually underestimate the real impact of the EU activity on Italian 
legislation. A careful examination of the content of national legislative acts 
would be required in order to shed more light on this point. 
Second, it might be interesting to test whether, ceteris paribus, the "electoral 
effects" detected for the Italian parliament also apply to the European 
                                                 
47 A recent example is the rejection of the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands. 
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Parliament, which, since the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht (1993), 
act as a co-legislator on an equal footing with the Council in a relevant number 
of policy areas through the co-decision procedure. Unfortunately, it does not yet 
seem possible to do so at present, because only three elections were held since 
1993 and all of them took place at regular five-year intervals (1994, 1999 and 
2004). It can be noticed, however, that the most intense activity by the 
European Parliament was actually registered in 2004 (a regular electoral year), 
when 104 legislative acts (55 regulations and 49 directives) were passed. This 
might suggest that regular elections have no effect on the legislative activity of 
the European Parliament, just as happens in Italy, but clearly more observations 
will be necessary before being able to draw meaningful conclusions.    
Third, our research could be extended to other EU countries characterised 
by a federal structure or strong regional autonomy (such as Germany, Spain, 
the United Kingdom). This would permit to make interesting comparisons and 
probably to generalise our findings about the relations among national, 
supranational and sub-national levels of government in Europe. 
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Annex 1. Allocation of legislative competences between the State and the 
regions in Italy 
 
 AFTER 2001 BEFORE 2001 
State's exclusive legislative 
competence 
1) foreign policy and 
international relations of the 
State; relations of the State 
with the European Union; right 
of asylum and legal status of 
the citizens of States not 
belonging to the European 
Union; 
2) immigration;
3) relations between the 
republic and religious 
denominations; 
4) defence and armed forces; 
state security; weapons, 
ammunitions and explosives;
5) money, protection of 
savings, financial markets; 
protection of competition; 
currency system; state taxation 
system and accounting; 
equalization of regional 
financial resources;
6) state organs and their 
electoral laws; state referenda; 
election of the European 
Parliament; 
7) organization and 
administration of the State and 
of national public bodies;
8) law, order and security, 
aside from the local 
administrative police;
9) citizenship, registry of 
Any matters not expressly 
reserved to concurrent 
legislation 
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personal status and registry of 
residence; 
10) jurisdiction and procedural 
laws; civil and criminal law; 
administrative tribunals;
11) determination of the basic 
standards of welfare related to 
those civil and social rights that 
must be guaranteed in the 
entire national territory;
12) general rules on education;
13) social security;
14) electoral legislation, local 
government and fundamental 
functions of municipalities, 
provinces and metropolitan 
cities; 
15) customs, protection of 
national boundaries and 
international prophylactic 
measures; 
16) weights, units of 
measurement and time 
standards; coordination of the 
informative, statistical and 
information-technology aspects 
of the data of the state, 
regional and local 
administrations; intellectual 
property; 
17) protection of the 
environment, of the ecosystem 
and of the cultural heritage. 
Shared legislative 
competence (concurrent 
legislation) 
1) international and European 
Union relations of the regions;  
2) foreign trade;  
3) protection and safety of 
labour;  
4) education, without 
infringement of the autonomy 
1) organization of regional 
offices and administrative 
bodies;  
2) local urban and rural police; 
3) fairs and markets; 
4) public charity and health 
care and hospitals; 
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of schools and other 
institutions, and with the 
exception of vocational 
training;  
5) professions;  
6) scientific and technological 
research and support for 
innovation in the productive 
sectors;  
7) health protection;  
8) food;  
9) sports regulations;  
10) disaster relief service;  
11) land-use regulation and 
planning;  
12) harbours and civil airports; 
13) major transportation and 
navigation networks;  
14) regulation of media and 
communication;  
15) production, transportation 
and national distribution of 
energy;  
16) complementary and 
integrative pensions systems;  
17) harmonization of the 
budgetary rules of the public 
sector and coordination of the 
public finance and the taxation 
system;  
18) promotion of the 
environmental and cultural 
heritage, and promotion and 
organization of cultural 
activities; 
19) savings banks, rural co-
operative banks, regional 
banks;  
20) regional institutions for 
credit to agriculture and land 
5) craft schools, vocational 
training and educational 
assistance; 
6) local museums and 
libraries; 
7) urban planning; 
8) tourism and hotel industry; 
9) tramlines and motorways of 
regional interest; 
10) roads, waterworks and 
public works of regional 
interest; 
11) lake navigation and 
harbours;   
12) mineral and thermal 
waters; 
13) quarries and peat-bogs; 
14) hunting; 
15) fishing in internal waters; 
16) agriculture and forests; 
17) handicrafts; 
18) other matters indicated by 
constitutional laws.* 
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development. 
Regions' exclusive legislative 
competence 
Any matters not expressly 
reserved to state law. 
- 
*According to legislative decree 616/77, the regions might legislate in all matters in which 
administrative functions were delegated to them by the State. In addition to those mentioned in 
the Constitution, some more matters were thus included, especially in the environmental and 
cultural sectors. 
Source: Italian Constitution (Art. 117) 
 
 
Annex 2. Data sources and summary statistics 
 
Data on EU legislation are taken from the EUR-Lex database, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/index.htm. For the breakdown into policy 
categories, see the classification in Alesina et al. (2005: 316-17). Only the two 
following modifications have been applied: Money and macro policy also 
includes category 01.6 and Institutional provisions includes categories 01.1-5.  
Data on national legislation comes from the UTET LEX + CODEX database, 
available at http://www.utetgiuridica.it/. Legislative acts have then been 
reclassified by the author to match the policy categories as defined in the paper.   
Data on regional laws is from the House of Representatives (Camera dei 
Deputati) database, available at http://camera.ancitel.it/lrec. Since no 
classification is provided by the database, regional laws have been directly 
classified by the author according to the policy categories as defined in the 
paper.  
Table A.2 displays the summary statistics of variables employed in the 
regressions presented in section 4. 
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Table A.2 Summary statistics of variables 
 Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
LAW_ITA 33 185.7 47.7 102 274 
LAW_EU 33 1867.0 603.0 1168 3161 
LAW_REG 33 1052.6 221.2 538 1462 
EL 33 0.2 0.4 0 1 
EARLY_EL 33 0.2 0.4 0 1 
REGULAR_EL 33 0.1 0.2 0 1 
Source: own calculations 
 
